Engaging Diasporas as Development Partners for Home and Destination Countries: Challenges for Policymakers

Prepared for IOM by

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This paper reviews existing policies aimed at engaging diasporas for development purposes, and discusses the policy context and factors that facilitate their mobilization. It addresses a number of key policy challenges in the light of ongoing national practices, general research evidence, and IOM’s research and operational experience. National policy approaches and a growing number of pilot programmes are reviewed, providing a combined analysis of policies and programmes. Considering that attention at national and international level is largely focused on remittances and remittance policies, this paper also examines how policymakers could enhance the non-financial contributions made by diasporas. The material presented in this document aims to inform policymakers in home and host countries on existing practices and to provide a guide for those engaged in formulating policies to engage diasporas as active partners for development, in particular in countries of origin.

The paper identifies and discusses some of the key stages for policy development, starting with the definition of diasporas, data gathering on diasporas and their respective policy implications. The document then examines the development needs and strategies to which diasporas can contribute and the role of diaspora-driven initiatives. Existing programmes and incentives in the home countries aiming to favour relations with diasporas are subsequently discussed. Finally, the paper explores a diversity of diaspora resources (human, financial, entrepreneurial, social, affective and local) and identifies various means to encourage the productive contributions to be made by diasporas.

The paper concludes with a discussion of the policy role in supporting diasporas and maximizing their contributions for the benefit of migrants, home and host countries and includes a list of policy recommendations and a roadmap summarizing the key stages of diasporas policy making.

Diasporas have been making contributions for a long time, without waiting for policy to mobilize them and sometimes even in spite of these. However, diaspora contributions are directly related to institutional frameworks, socio-economic settings, political environments as well as issues of perceptions, images, trust and social identification, in both the home and host country. While there is a growing policy interest in tapping, mobilizing and channelling diaspora contributions, the role of policies should be clearly defined, and the approaches that can effectively facilitate the engagement of diasporas for development understood to ensure that diasporas are not deprived of the ownership of their contributions.
I. INTRODUCTION

Rationale

The role of diasporas in development strategies, poverty reduction and economic growth is attracting considerable policy interest, involving diasporas, host countries and home countries. The interests of these diverse stakeholders meet around one main question: What can be done today to maximize the development benefits of migration for all?

The term “diasporas” refers to expatriate groups which, in contrast to “migrants”, applies to expatriate populations abroad and generations born abroad to foreign parents who are or may be citizens of their countries of residence. The overall development potential of the people referred as diasporas can reach significant levels, involving such areas as business creation, trade links, investments, remittances, skills circulation, exchange of experiences and even impacts on social and cultural roles of men and women in the home society.

Some major trends explain the amplification of the policy interest in diasporas. There is increasing awareness among countries of their own “diasporas” and their potential for poverty reduction, development and economic growth. This has triggered initiatives to collect data, to reach out to diaspora groups, to advocate dual citizenship and to positively influence the images and perceptions of expatriates in home and host countries. The multiplication of organized diaspora initiatives corresponds to the affirmation of the civil society as a major development player and the increase in grass-root initiatives. In many cases, diaspora groups have played a lobbying role and influenced public awareness on expatriate populations abroad. Internet and other telecommunication means have been instrumental in this expansion, while modern transport systems are facilitating mobility. Finally, the recognition of the limits of many traditional development policies favours the exploration of new and complementary development avenues.

There are nevertheless some major limitations to the involvement of diasporas in development policies today. First of all, migration phenomena in general are not well integrated into development policies and many programmes are developed without sharing knowledge and resources. For instance, very few national development strategies include expatriate networks as formal partners. Few studies assess the real impact of the influence diasporas have on development through trade, investments,
business exchanges, social networks and human capital transfers, thus limiting data
on the economic and social contributions of diasporas. Besides, even fewer studies
articulate the interests that host and home country have in transnational populations
or analyse possible conflicts of those interests.

Scope

This paper is based on the recognition that, despite a new body of research on
diasporas with a development focus, there is a knowledge gap at the policy level re-
garding the policies being implemented, the institutions in charge, the programmes
and tools that actually facilitate diaspora contributions, and of what works and what
does not. It should also be mentioned that at present policy interest is very much
focused on ongoing migration flows and in particular on temporary labour migration
schemes. Diaspora studies are of specific interest as they can refocus policy attention
on a different target, namely expatriates based permanently abroad, second-generation
nationals and people who acquire citizenship in their host country but nevertheless
wish to continue to support their home country development.

The objective is to examine what we know at this stage about engaging diaspo-
ras for development and to propose a roadmap for policymakers based on existing
evidence. This paper complements existing research on diasporas, as it addresses the
different stages of policy making in engaging diasporas for development, using find-
ings from data and studies in this field, combined with original knowledge extracted
from IOM research such as the survey on “Diasporas Policies” undertaken by IOM
in February 2005,\textsuperscript{1} the World Migration Report 2005,\textsuperscript{2} as well as lessons drawn from
IOM operational experience.

In addition to the policy focus, this paper also offers a global thematic scope, as it
does not equate diasporas with remittance transfers but rather explores the different
social, human, affective, financial and business dimensions involved. The document
uses examples from worldwide diaspora policy experiences and from developed and
developing countries alike. The document is targeted at a mixed audience, includ-
ing policymakers and practitioners dealing with diaspora policies for development.
However, this research does not analyse specific diaspora initiatives, nor the political
and cultural dimensions of diaspora policies; nor are the information and analyses
presented exhaustive.

This paper presents an overview of the state of knowledge on diaspora policies. It
then addresses a number of challenges in regard to diaspora policy development:
1. How to define and gather data on diasporas?
2. How to incorporate diaspora contributions into the development strategies of the home and the host country?
3. How to identify appropriate partners within the diasporas?
4. What institutional frameworks and incentives can facilitate diaspora engagement for development in the home country?
5. What resources are available within diasporas that could contribute to development and how can these be maximized?

The paper concludes with a discussion of policies in supporting and maximizing diaspora contributions, a summary of recommendations based on lessons learnt from existing studies and policy experience, and a list of key policy issues to guide and support policy development.

**Brief overview of the state of knowledge**

Diaspora studies have commonly proceeded from a sociological and anthropological perspective, such as exploring group identity and belonging as well as dealing with networks and collective dimensions. However, today diasporas are progressively dealt with in the political sciences, economics and the study of international relations. A wide range of political science literature deals with diasporas through the study of transnationalism, where individual choices and trajectories transcend the nation state and single cultural and national identities and affiliations. In addition to scholarly literature, a number of events at national, regional or the international level draw policy attention to diasporas. A few studies explore how diasporas facilitate social and economic development in their homelands and make the link between what is known about diasporas and the implications at policy level.

A number of academic authors tend to use the notion of “transnational communities” to emphasize the idea of movement and exchange between home and host countries, and to attract attention to the existence of informal networks that contribute to what are often circular movements. However, the notion of “diaspora” seems to better incorporate populations that are “settled” abroad, people who became citizens of their host country and second-born generations. Moreover, the term “diaspora” was preferred in this paper, given the widespread use of this term at policy level.

The migration and development literature offers some insights into diaspora issues with a geographical focus. From a thematic perspective, the majority of research papers deal with contributions to the development of the home country by expatriate
populations abroad, in particular through remittances, and with the issues of brain circulation/drain/gain/waste. A growing literature is available, composed of surveys or studies on remittances, transfer facilitation modalities and development objectives. However, this literature deals mainly with the private transfers migrants make to their families, and is rarely related to other types of diaspora transfers, either financial (investments, trade, etc.) or non-financial (technical and business skills, etc.). Skills circulation is mainly addressed from the perspective of brain drain, workers’ rights and the mobility of the highly skilled, exploring how to harness the potential of returns, with particular emphasis on the medical sector.

Diaspora contributions to development and measures to maximize their potential are increasingly addressed through the migration and development literature. Johnson and Sedaca (2004), for instance, provide a most useful summary of diaspora-related development programmes looking at remittances, community development, diaspora business linkages, diaspora investment instruments and knowledge transfers. Lowell and Gerova (2004) provide a valuable categorization of diaspora mechanisms, including “optimal brain strain, return migration, financial instruments, entrepreneurial investments, hometown associations, immigration and trade and professional diaspora networks”. Newland (2004) analyses the impact of diaspora inputs on poverty reduction and offers suggestions for donors to strengthen the impact of development assistance by making transnationalism an engine for development. Finally, De Haas (2006) focuses on host country strategies in case studies of the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and France, as well as on international agencies and ongoing initiatives targeting diasporas for development.

Additionally, the migration and development nexus is discussed at large by international organizations and governments and in numerous regional and international conferences. Box 1 presents a few selected international initiatives emphasizing the potential role of diasporas, while IOM’s initiatives and programmes are presented in Annex 1.
**European Commission Communication on “Migration and Development: Some Concrete Recommendations”, September 2005**

The document builds on the December 2002 EC Communication as a contribution to setting up a framework for integrating migration issues into the EU external relations and development policies. The Communication was developed in consultation with a number of international organizations. Diasporas are recognized as potential actors for development of the countries of origin. The Commission emphasizes two main areas of work: identify and engage diaspora organizations in development strategies, and set up databases where members of diasporas can register voluntarily. In its annexes, the Communication puts forward several concrete orientations for EU contributions and relates this exercise with the framework of the AENEAS Programme for potential funding.

**The Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM), October 2005**

GCIM has been established to improve cooperation among UN and other international agencies, and aims to provide a comprehensive response to migration issues. The final report, released in October 2005, devotes one chapter to “Migration and Development”, realizing the potential of human mobility. The report uses the term “diasporas” and emphasizes, in particular, the role of hometown associations and the growth of social networks. At policy level the report underlines the role of governments in mobilizing knowledge networks and supporting trade and investments driven by diasporas.

**High-level Dialogue on International Migration and Development, UN General Assembly, September 2006**

In 2006 the High-level Dialogue at the UN General Assembly discussed the multidimensional aspects of international migration and development. The contributions by diasporas to development were addressed within the proposed four main round tables: (1) Effects of international migration on economic and social development; (2) measures to ensure the respect for and protection of the human rights of all migrants, and to prevent and combat the smuggling of migrants and the trafficking in persons; (3) multidimensional aspects of international migration and development, including remittances and (4) promoting the building of partnerships and capacity building and the sharing of best practices at all levels, including at the bilateral and regional levels, for the benefit of countries and migrants alike.
Defining a multifaceted reality

There is no single accepted definition of the term “diaspora”,19 neither is there a legal recognition of the term which consequently has given rise to many different meanings and interpretations. For the purpose of this paper, a broad definition of “diasporas” is proposed as: *members of ethnic and national communities, who have left, but maintain links with, their homelands*. The term “diasporas” conveys the idea of transnational populations, living in one place, while still maintaining relations with their homelands, being both “here” and “there”. We do not capitalize the first letter to avoid the confusion with the historic Jewish or Greek Diaspora, and purposely use the plural to reflect the diversity of populations that can be acknowledged as diasporas.

Countries have adopted different ways of referring to their “diasporas”. The wealth of existing terms is the first sign of the policy interest in these populations: *nationals abroad, permanent immigrants, citizen of (X) origin living abroad, non-resident of (X) origin, persons of (X) origin, expatriates, transnational citizens*. These terms are used to cover multiple realities that differ from country to country: people settled in a host country on a permanent basis, labour migrants based abroad for a period of time, dual citizens, ethnic diasporas, citizens of the host country or second-generation groups.

One useful definition of “diasporas” is provided by the UK House of Commons (Sixth Report of Session 2003-4, Volume 1): *International migrants who, although dispersed from their homelands, remain in some way part of their community of origin*. This definition captures the following points: individuals are dispersed, possibly across several countries, but they maintain an interest and an affiliation to their home country, either “real” or “imagined”.

Defining “diasporas” raises tangible issues of time, place of birth and citizenship, as well as subtle questions of identity and belonging.

**Time:** When does a “migrant” cease to be one and become part of the “diaspora”? Given the increase in circular migration it is difficult to limit today the notion of diasporas to those who are settled “forever” in a country other from where they were born. The modern notion of “diasporas” has lost its dimension of irreversibility and of exile. Migrants go to work abroad, sometimes under specific government schemes,
decide to stay longer, to return and to leave again. It appears that countries supporting temporary labour migration are also concerned with diaspora contributions, such as the Philippines, Bangladesh, Ukraine, Kenya, Ethiopia or Uganda.

**Place of birth:** Second and third-generation migrants born to immigrant parents abroad can have a stronger feeling of belonging to the diasporas than first generations and *retain some form of commitment to, and/or interest in, the country of origin of their parents*. Thus place of birth does not itself define belonging to a diaspora.

**Citizenship:** Many nationals acquired the citizenship of their host country. Their contributions therefore would not be included in “migrant workers’” remittance flows, for instance, whereas they may well be interested in investing in different ways in their home country. Thus, we do not qualify diasporas according to their citizenship.

**Identity and belonging:** Butler’s definition of diasporas (2001) draws attention to the intangible dimension of the term. Being part of a diaspora implies a sense of identification with a group, or the feeling of belonging to a certain identity. Families play a role in supporting or rejecting this identification, as do legal norms (citizenship for second generations), educational programmes and the possibility to travel. Ministries for expatriates, as well as consulates and embassies are beginning to pay more attention to the “feeling of belonging” and to the non-material dimension of engaging with diasporas. However, if symbolic inclusion matters, it needs to be translated into actual inclusion (legislative and institutional realities).

**Diaspora definitions and policy implications**

The definition of diasporas will have a direct impact on the classification, registration and measurement of diaspora population, as well as on the policy focus. The incorporation of very different groups in a common identity addressed as “diasporas” may lead to a dilution of the concept, in particular if short-term migrants are also included in the diaspora definition. This paper therefore highlights the contextual dimension of the diaspora notion that calls for flexible definitions that take into account both concrete (citizenship, length of stay, rights) and intangible matters (feeling of identity, perceptions, trust).

India introduced a key distinction between *Non-Resident Indians* (NRIs) and *People of Indian Origin* (PIOs). The NRI status is for *Indian citizens holding an Indian passport and residing abroad for an indefinite period, whether for employment, business, vocation or any other purpose*, while the PIO status designates *foreign citizens of Indian origin or descent*, including second and subsequent generations.
The Indian classification demonstrates well that “diasporas” can be a wider concept than “migrants” when it incorporates both foreign-born people and expatriates living abroad. By defining two specific diaspora categories, India facilitates the relations and contributions of diasporas with very different backgrounds.

The African Union convened an expert meeting for member states in April 2005 to prepare a definition of the “African Diaspora”. The adopted definition is: *The African Diaspora consists of peoples of African origin living outside the continent, irrespective of their citizenship and nationality, and who are willing to contribute to the development of the continent and the building of the African Union.* This broad definition calls attention to a number of significant policy points: a continental instead of national belonging (i.e. a non-national diaspora definition) and highly symbolic and political facets. Voluntarily belonging to the “African Diaspora” is intrinsically related to the willingness to contribute to the development and support of the African Union. This definition therefore relates voluntary contributions to belonging to a collective entity.

The term “diaspora(s)” conveys a collective dimension: diasporas as a community, a group or even as an organized network and association sharing common interests. However, diasporas are made up of individuals with different personal histories, strategies, expectations and potentials. Recognizing the collective and individual dimension of diasporas directly affects policy development: some measures are intended for groups, such as supporting scientific diaspora networks or channelling collective funds into community projects, while others benefit individuals, such as lowering transfer costs, facilitating scholarships, simplifying citizenship rules and offering tax breaks.

Diasporas have to be properly defined and determined to yield accurate quantitative and qualitative data.

**Data collection on diasporas**

Reliable data and information are essential for governments to engage diasporas in practical programmes for development.

The most effective way to collect data on diasporas is to combine domestic and external resources, as well as data from the sending and the receiving country. The domestic resources are consulates, ministries of foreign affairs, education and justice, the national statistics offices, and population registers and censuses and employment agencies can also provide data. External resources include statistics divisions of in-
ternational organizations and international census bureaux. Sending countries keep records of exit data that can be compared with the entry data in receiving countries and compilations of foreign-born statistics.

Data are also available from a number of non-governmental diaspora organizations, such as AFFORD which has undertaken a profiling exercise on first and second-generation diasporas. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has created a database (2004) aiming to offer comparable data on foreign-born populations, covering 227 countries of origin and 29 receiving countries within the OECD area. The database also differentiates between foreign-born and non-citizens. This database is of great interest to sending countries to improve their knowledge on their own expatriates abroad. The largest numbers of expatriates in the OECD area are from Turkey, central and eastern Europe, and migrants from North Africa are concentrated in France, Spain and the Netherlands, with Spain hosting over 740,000 expatriates from Latin America.

Five main levels of useful data on diasporas can be identified:

a) Individual data

In order to register the members of diasporas abroad it is first of all necessary to define the target population. This raises major issues, such as citizenship and residence definitions, as well as practical registration problems. Data on diasporas involves, among others, demography, location, country of destination, gender, age, qualification, occupation, length of stay.

The sources of information concerning the size of the diasporas can be very diverse. Censuses can measure stocks of residents abroad through censuses in the home country (measuring residents temporarily overseas) and more rarely censuses abroad, such as undertaken by Chile in 2003. Consular registers, such as those kept by Colombia offer information on expatriates. Identification cards delivered at home for expatriates or abroad are also a useful data source, such as in the case of India (PIO and NRI, cf. supra.) and Mexico (Matricula Consular in collaboration with the United States). Other sources can be databases, such as the Filipino Overseas Information System related to the Commission on Filipinos Overseas and Statistics and to the National Registry of Overseas Absentee Voters. A number of developed countries keep special databases of their citizens abroad. For instance, the Database of Italians Abroad, where citizens staying abroad for more than 12 months register with consulates abroad and the information is transmitted to one single national database. Other indications are obtainable through voter evidence and the number of voters abroad, when countries do allow voting outside the home country.
Other data sources can yield indications on flows of nationals to foreign countries, in particular entrance data from receiving countries, while exit data from home countries are less reliable and not systematically gathered. Hugo (2004) also proposes innovative ways to collect data on diasporas, such as measuring the number of Internet hits from foreign nationals on, for instance, the Australian Football League website, that might well yield useful indications of diasporas’ geographical concentration.

**BOX 2**

The Integrated Migration Information System, IMIS,\(^{22}\) is a capacity-building project funded by the Italian government carried out in partnership with the Egyptian Ministry of Manpower and Emigration which offers practical solutions in some key areas of the labour migration process. Among others, the system aims to facilitate selective labour migration programmes for both sending and receiving countries, and to attract migrant remittances and migrant investments to the home country. IMIS also offers psychographic data, that is, migrants’ views and suggestions concerning Egypt in general, as well as current economic and social development policies, prospects for potential investments, current ties and major sources of information. The implementation of this project in 2002 demonstrated that to work towards making such a tool valuable and efficient, capacity building, full ownership and synergies with other parties involved in migration dynamics should be encouraged.

**b) Collective data**

This type of data includes statistics on a variety of associations, networks, community organizations, clubs and societies, including non-profit, religious, political, human rights, educational, professional, scientific. El Salvador has registered 400 associations abroad in a database, which is combined with a database of local institutions in El Salvador interested in diasporas. Collective data offer a good insight into the level of organization of diasporas and their priorities for action. This information is most useful to identify partners for collaboration among diasporas.

**c) Transnational flows**

One of the major policy interests in diasporas is driven by the transnational links created and facilitated by such expatriate populations between their home and host countries. Accurate information is key to inform policymakers willing to collaborate with diasporas on existing flows of goods and funds and to define priorities for action.
Remittances, defined as transfers of private funds from expatriates abroad to their home country, are an example of such transnational flows that attract significant policy attention today. Although an important number of initiatives aim to measure and analyse these flows, they are limited by the important volume of informal transfers that escape statistical measurement.

Less attention is devoted to other types of transfers and transnational flows, and statistics are therefore still missing on trade and foreign direct investments driven by diasporas. To make these figures available, business and trade reporting should be adapted in order to register the proportion of diaspora contributions.

d) Qualitative data

Qualitative data are important for the design and implementation of policies targeting diasporas. Information on stocks and flows is insufficient in respect of policies concerning returns. The decision to return, be it temporary or permanent, will depend on a number of factors that can be evaluated through surveying diaspora groups and analysing their personal strategies. Surveys on specific diasporas collect specific information through questionnaires and face-to-face interviews. Improved access to information on circular and temporary migration can also provide relevant guidance to involving diasporas for development purposes. Longitudinal studies are needed for the long-term monitoring of diasporas and to understand the evolution of their interests, attitudes and strategies.

Knowing the root causes of migration and the history of migration flows that led to the formation of diasporas are important to understand the status and strategies of diasporas, and the development of appropriate policies. For instance, Arab migration, in particular Moroccan migration to Europe, has undergone major changes (IOM-LAS, 2003) during the last 20 years. The number of people heading enterprises and in leading professions has increased leading to new areas of exchange between countries of origin and destination. This type of information cannot be obtained nor assessed through the mere counting of expatriates.

e) Gender-differentiated data

Gender-disaggregated data are important to better measure and analyse the impact of migration on development, and to design policies that correspond to diasporas’ expectations and needs. Gender may be defined as the institutionalized and dynamic relation between men and women, a socially constructed reality at both the individual and collective level. Male and female migrants face different opportunities and vulnerabilities at each stage of the migration process and reap different returns from migration
in terms of income and the acquisition of skills. The Inter-American Development Bank (IADB, 2002) shows that women in Latin America are better at reimbursing microcredits and invest a greater share of their earnings in health and education. Diaspora initiatives and networks can also be gender specific. For instance, in France there were more than 1,000 OSIM (Organisations de solidarité internationale issues de l’immigration) in 2000, of which over 200 were African women associations.\textsuperscript{24}

The study by Refugee Action and IOM on nationals from the Somali region in Britain\textsuperscript{25} found, for instance, that as regards return opportunities most men were interested in employment and finances, whereas women were interested in health provision and education for children. Programmes aimed specifically at men and women in diasporas can therefore be designed to address the main areas of concern of men and women and support their engagement in job and enterprise creation, health and education provisions.

\textbf{Policy implications of data collection}

The availability of data often reflects the level and degree of policy interest and the quality of data collection mechanisms. Therefore, a documented increase of the growth of diasporas may reflect improved reporting measures and skills, rather than an actual increase as such.

A major barrier to data collection on diasporas is the reluctance of diaspora populations themselves to register with home country consulates, and to respond to surveys and governmental inquiries. However, by linking the procedure to register to services and the defence of migrant rights to the identification of diasporas, and ensuring improved participation of such communities in registration exercises, the availability and reliability of data on diasporas would also be greatly improved.

A second major challenge to data compilation on diasporas is the difficulty to quantify diaspora members, as some migrants will have acquired citizenships while others have not, some will remain undocumented or lose their ties with their home land. Some home countries will include second-generation migrants in their diasporas, some host countries will consider only the foreign born as diasporas. Furthermore, for some countries their communities abroad are too widely dispersed to be able to collect data.
As part of the Albanian Migration National Strategy Implementation Plan, a feasibility study on a system to register Albanian diasporas was conducted. This exercise includes an electronic short-term registration activity under the auspices of the Civil Status Data of Albanian residents abroad and maintained by the Local Civil Status Office. The registration process is conducted through the consular offices and supported by an information system, while also involving a significant number of other actors: a central unit to coordinate the peripheral registration conducted by consulates, civil status municipalities, the Ministry of Public Order and other institutions, such as the Statistical Office or the Ministry of Labour. The first step in the registration process occurs when an Albanian citizen comes for the first time to the consular office. Two types of data are collected: the “Civil Status data” and the “Diaspora data” (demographic, professional, educational). This case study demonstrates the importance of sharing data sources between the receiving and sending countries. The information gathered is transferred to Albania electronically, and staff are trained for this purpose as well as to inform migrants of the aims of the registration exercise.

For some countries, their interest in their expatriate communities abroad increases with the size of such communities. Some countries have been aware of their diasporas for a long time, for instance Italy, whose expatriate population is estimated at over 4 million, or Israel, Lebanon or Armenia. The interest of other countries is more recent, but is rapidly growing. For instance India, whose expatriate population stands at over 20 million worldwide, Ethiopia (1.5 million expatriates), Eritrea (a quarter of its population outside the country), Syria (whose expatriates nearly equal its resident population) Egypt (3 million workers in the Gulf countries) or Bangladesh (1 million expatriates settled abroad and 3.8 million temporary labour migrants). For still others, the realization of the existence of their diasporas is just beginning and is often linked to political and economic conditions and changes in migration trends, such as characterized in the ex-Soviet countries.
III. INCORPORATING DIASPORA CONTRIBUTIONS INTO DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES

Development can be defined in a broad sense of sustainable economic growth, poverty reduction, social advancement, human empowerment and socio-economic equity. Individual or collective initiatives within a diasporic community can contribute to one or more of these goals. However, the sentimental attachment diasporas may have for their countries of birth may not automatically engender mutually beneficial outcomes. For this to occur, appropriate and timely policies need to be in place to recognize and harness the potential contributions by and beneficial interaction with diasporas in support of development and growth in both their home and host countries.

Prior to developing a policy aimed at linking diasporas into the development process and engaging in activities with expatriates or their associations, policymakers should have a clear idea of their own development needs and gaps to be bridged and the potential contributions diasporas could make to achieve these goals, as well as of the diasporas’ own development agenda and objectives. Such considerations must be accommodated within a broad migratory context and give due consideration to both home and host country perspectives. Seen from that perspective, diaspora development policies are at the cross roads of home and host country interests.

Home country strategies

There are some major policy motivations which support the involvement of diasporas in their home countries’ development strategies. For instance,

Engaging diasporas in the development process can limit the costs of emigration and mitigate brain drain

Emigration can represent a considerable cost for home countries, while there is no conclusive evidence of positive effects of emigration on local labour markets. According to economic theory, departures should ease unemployment in the local markets, but this is not generally the case, as there may be rigidities in the labour market, the inability or unwillingness of local workers to learn new and needed skills or to adjust to new working methods, or to move to new regions. At the Third UN Coordination Meeting on International Migration, Lucas (2004) presented new findings on the emigration effects on the labour market in low- and middle-income countries of origin. In some countries the departure of part of the local workforce opens opportunities for others without noticeable quality decline in the workforce, this is the
case in Bangladesh, India, Indonesia or Sri Lanka, but not for the African continent. Emigration can also reduce labour demand and cause unemployment. To mitigate any of these adverse effects, home countries try to look for innovative solutions to tap into the development potential of their expatriate communities abroad.

There is evidence that economically more advanced countries have benefited more from the transfers made by their diasporas, for instance Israel or South Korea. To involve diasporas could certainly mitigate the cost of emigration for the home countries, but these often either do not use or lack the capacity to use this potential. As countries of origin do stand to lose a dynamic population through emigration, in addition to the return on investments made in education, it remains difficult to prove that diasporas, in spite of representing a genuine development potential, could actually compensate the loss incurred. Encouraging emigration with the objective of benefiting from diaspora returns might, therefore, be a very costly strategy for the sending country in the long term.

**Emigrants improve their skills abroad which, on their return, should benefit the home countries**

It is difficult to find conclusive evidence for the assumption that migrants returning from abroad have generally improved their skills. It is also very difficult to determine whether returnees are among the most successful migrants abroad or, on the contrary, those who failed to “make it” abroad. The UK House of Commons cites two Oxfam examples of Turkish and Thai workers who returned without having acquired useful new skills.

A 2004 study investigated the skills and expertise of Zimbabweans living in the UK and in South Africa to ascertain their interest in participation in development-related activities. Almost 25 per cent of Zimbabwean emigrants were trained doctors and nurses, and 70 to 90 per cent of all Zimbabwean university graduates worked outside their country of origin. A major finding of the study is evidence of deskilling among the surveyed professionals. Deskilling occurred because of obstacles such as the difficulty to acquire legal status, to have academic qualifications recognized and to master the language of the receiving country. These findings contradict the general idea of brain circulation that benefits the sending countries when their own nationals return after a successful professional experience abroad. The study also showed that Zimbabweans in South Africa benefited differently from migration in terms of professional achievements compared with Zimbabweans in the UK, whose experience had been more successful. This confirms that a number of legal, social and economic factors in the host country influence the potential of diasporas to transfer knowledge to the home country.
The survey on the professional capacity of nationals from Somali regions in Britain found that the levels at which they were employed in Britain were below those they had occupied before coming to work in Britain. This result is correlated to the knowledge of the language and to having a secure immigration status. The length of stay can also impact the acquisition of skills and qualifications. Consequently, policies favouring the acquisition of a legal status and new skills in the host country can also be beneficial to home countries. However, it is impossible to generalize on diasporas improving their skills abroad which in return would benefit the home countries and only in-depth surveys of particular groups can accurately illustrate this process.

**Engaging diasporas might have a beneficial trickle-down effect for home countries**

A major interest driving diasporas for development studies is the perceived importance of the impact of transnational populations in the development process. Orozco (2003) summarizes the economic involvement of diasporas under the “Five Ts”: “tourism, transportation, telecommunications, trade, and transmission of monetary remittances”. Although studies can quantify the level of remittances and investments, it is more difficult to accurately evaluate the cultural and human impact of expatriate populations on their home and host countries: changing role models, influencing gender roles, altering demographic and familial behaviours and perceptions of what a successful life should be.

Innovative practices targeting diasporas could, for instance, favour foreign direct investment policy in general by eliminating bureaucratic obstacles, securing transactions, improving business environments and opening new windows of opportunities. In this sense, the Indian Investment Centre targets both diasporas abroad as well as Indians wishing to set up projects abroad.

Countries of origin wishing to make the most of their diasporas face a number of challenges:

**Integrating diaspora inputs into endogenous growth projects that represent real added value for the national economy**

As reported by the Asian Development Bank (2004) 19 of the top 20 Indian software businesses were founded or managed by professionals from the Indian diaspora. The software industry has created 400,000 new jobs in India and exported over US$ 6 billion worth of goods and services on 2002. This is a successful example of the contributions made by diasporas. South Korea has also benefited from the effective integration of diaspora inflows into the local economic growth mechanisms.
Further scrutiny and analysis of these case studies could offer insights into the most appropriate and effective mechanisms with which to support diasporas to sustain home-based industries.

**Including diasporas in existing development strategies**

Country strategies for Benin, Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Cape Verde, Madagascar and Mali were developed in cooperation with IOM and shared with home governments and donors, in order to match the development concerns of these countries with available resources from the diasporas. In its Sustainable Development Poverty Reduction Strategy Annual Progress Report (2002-2003) Ethiopia included the government commitment to expand private sector activities by engaging the members of the Ethiopian diasporas. Ghana initiated a Poverty Reduction Scheme promoting SMEs in the agro-industry that explicitly recognizes diasporas as a source of mobilizing funds to finance the anti-poverty strategy.

To sum up, if evidence shows that diaspora resources can bring benefits to the sending country, it would be mistaken to perceive them as a panacea for all existing difficulties besetting the domestic economy. Indeed, benefits as may be derived from diaspora involvement should complement appropriate policies in the home country.

**Host country strategies**

The motives host countries may have to work together with expatriate communities within their borders may be summarized as follows:

**Diasporas may bridge the transnational space and facilitate transnational cooperation**

Some host countries consult diaspora organizations concerning the design and implementation of their home country development plans. Most of these initiatives are recent and driven by the aim to rationalize development policies. In the UK, for instance, the International Development Committee, appointed by the House of Commons, launched an inquiry in July 2003 and held ten evidence sessions, the last one involving members of the Sierra Leone diaspora. In addition, the UK Department for International Development (DFID) produced the Indian Country Assistance Plan in consultation with the Indian diaspora community and also collaborates with diverse other diaspora initiatives, such as the Black and Minority Organization and Connection for Development Network. The UK also involved the Bangladeshi diaspora in the design of the Bangladesh Country Assistance Plan.

France set up a federation of NGOs to facilitate access to funding for projects for
their communities of origin. Bilateral collaboration involving diasporas exists with Senegal, Benin, Congo and Sierra Leone. In 2002-04 France funded 2.6 million euros to mobilize Malians in France to contribute to education and small businesses in Mali.

The Netherlands involves diaspora associations through the National Ethnic Minorities Consultative Committee (LOM) in accordance with the Policy Memorandum of the House of Representatives (2003). Development agencies are also instrumental in taking due account of the contributions diaspora are able to make towards home-country development. DFID and the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) finance diaspora-led development events and projects, supporting entrepreneurship and small business creation. USAID works with Ethiopian-born Israelis skilled in health and education to help address AIDS in Ethiopia. The development agencies of Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Norway, New Zealand and Japan support activities engaging diasporas in specific professional sectors or regions. Australia finances development programmes with a specific interest in remittance flows to Indonesia and Papua New Guinea.

**Co-development strategies**

The mobilization of diasporas is part of the co-development approach favoured by a number of governments and initiated by the French government in 2000 through conventions with Senegal, Mali, Morocco and the Comoros with the objective to organize the mobility of temporary migrants, regulate movements and promote the involvement of diasporas for the benefit of their home country development. The French government co-finances local community projects while at least 15 per cent of the project cost is covered by migrant associations. Italy and Senegal launched the Commodity Aid Programme, a bilateral programme offering credit facilities for small- and medium-sized enterprises and intended to promote the engagement of the Senegalese diasporas in the local private sector development.

According to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), “the interaction between migration and development could be most successfully achieved through co-development policies” and that “co-development policies aimed at involving migrants as actors of development who strengthen cooperation between home and host societies should be actively promoted at the European level”.

In 1997 the co-development policy was analysed in a report to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Nair Sami, 1997). The author identified co-development policy as an innovative approach aimed at achieving common objectives between the home and host country. The report states that co-development did not aim to return migrants (but
it does emphasize that legal status in the host country is a *sine qua non* condition) nor did it favour new migration flows, but rather sought to create the social conditions in home countries that are able to alleviate migration pressures and change the mentalities of potential migrants to look for opportunities at home rather than seeking them abroad. The co-development policy requires further assessment, in particular as it is sometimes perceived as promoting restrictive migration objectives. Nevertheless, it does represent a formal approach aimed at combining home and host country interests, while also acknowledging migrants as key elements in this process.

**Diasporas at the crossroads of interests between home and host countries**

Home and host countries’ interests intermingle concerning diasporas: the status of migrants and diasporas in the host country directly affects their strategies towards home countries. Diaspora contributions are a function of personal strategies towards the home country as well as to the legal, political, social and economic status of the individual in the host country. Moreover, the development potential of diasporas depends on the economic ranking of the host country as a high-, middle- or low-income country. Studies often concentrate on high-income host countries even though only a quarter of migrant flows from non-OECD are directed to OECD countries. The UK House of Commons (2003-04) document argues that migrants in many of the less-developed countries face unfavourable conditions which also affect their development potential either there or in their home countries.
IV. PARTNERING WITH RELEVANT DIASPORAS

Diaspora individuals and diaspora-organized entities are extremely varied. Decision makers willing to collaborate with diasporas in home and host countries are faced with a multitude of interlocutors who often represent diverse interests. For home country policies engaging diasporas for development to be realistic and effective, the home country’s development strategy and the particular choice of diaspora members willing to engage themselves either for motives of philanthropy or profit, in particular development activities in their home countries, will need to be compatible and mutually supportive.

Typology of diaspora initiatives

A broad range of motivations and expectations can lead to the constitution of diaspora organizations, initiatives networks and associations. Different reasons to migrate create different types of diasporic linkages with home countries and lead to the formation of different types of diaspora networks (Barré, 2003). The following table offers some examples of different diaspora initiatives geared towards development and provides links to their websites.

| Business networks | The Lebanese Business Network links Lebanese entrepreneurs abroad and business opportunities in Lebanon. Armenia High Tech Council and Silicon Armenia relate Armenian diasporas in the US to home country projects. Some diaspora networks have played a central role in paving the way to attract foreign investors. The Indus Entrepreneur is one of the most powerful networks, and has built up confidence of overseas investors such as Hewlett Packard transcending the actual Indian diasporas. |
| Chambers of commerce | The Caribbean American Chamber of Commerce and Industry, or the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce embed diasporas’ activities directly in the business community. For many other countries, diasporas facilitate business exchanges with the support of the chambers of commerce, such as, USA-Bangladesh, UK-Bulgaria. The Network of Colombian Chambers of Commerce and Sierra Leonean Diasporas Council actually have representatives of their diasporas in the chambers of commerce of the host country. |
| Professional networks | These represent the interests of developed and developing countries. Advance Australian Professionals in America\textsuperscript{34} is a network funded by Australian businesses in America. The Global Korean network\textsuperscript{35} aims to promote the formation and expansion of decentralized cultural, social, and economic networks among Korean communities overseas. The worldwide Indian Network\textsuperscript{36} and the Reverse Brain Drain Project Thailand\textsuperscript{37} target all types of skills, whereas the Hungarian Medical Association of America\textsuperscript{38} focuses on medical professionals. The Ethiopian North American Health Professionals Association (ENAHPA) is a partner for the IOM project MIDA in Ethiopia. |
| Scientific networks | The systematic search on the web undertaken for the project on scientific diasporas\textsuperscript{39} identified more than 200 networks having a web portal, among which 171 were selected to prepare the report and only 79 were considered as a reliable source. Some examples include AIVF – Association des informaticiens vietnamiens de France and The Chinese Association for Science and Technology (CAST-USA), which was established in 1992 with 500 members and counts today 3,000, and the African Scientific Network.\textsuperscript{40} Scientific networks are often based on university networks: Red de Estudiantes Argentinos en los Estados Unidos,\textsuperscript{41} Red Academica Uruguaya,\textsuperscript{42} the Ethiopian Knowledge and Technology Transfer Society (EKKTS) is a partner for IOM MIDA in Ethiopia. ALAS (Latin American Scientific Association) and ACAL (Academia de Ciencias de America Latina) have been working together since 1987 to identify technicians and scientists from the region and supported by UNESCO and the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs\textsuperscript{43} from 1994 to 2000. ECOMED is a network of scientists founded in 1995 in Quito, Ecuador, and brings together the Université de Paris V, the Institut Pasteur, the Universidad Central de Quito and the Colombian University Barranquilla. |
| Skills capacity | AfricaRecruit is a platform for debate with the African diaspora on how to add value to capacity building in Africa. They organize and support recruitment and career events, operate an employment database/search engine. ABANTU for Development is a non-governmental association aimed at mobilizing resources and skills among African communities to promote sustainable development in Africa. It also deals with inequalities between men and women in the United Kingdom. The *Forum pour le développement de l’Afrique* produced an African expert database. The African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF) is an independent, capacity-building institution launched in February 1991. ACBF started to develop a Directory of African Development Management Professionals. For the African Foundation for Development (AFFORD), a charity in the UK, the African diaspora is an important stakeholder in Africa’s development and it strives to involve Africans in sustainable projects for the promotion of development and job and skills. African Axis is active along similar lines in Belgium. The Jamaican Diaspora Canada Foundation addresses itself to Jamaican police officers in Canada to lend their expertise to Jamaica. |
| Community initiatives | The Hometown initiatives support local development, micro-enterprise and local community projects in Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay and Uruguay. The *Programa de Iniciativa Ciudadana 3 x 1 Mexico* matches migrant funds with federal, state and municipal funds; the Catalan Fund for Development Cooperation (FCCD) is a non-profit organization working mainly in Latin America and supports immigrants wishing to promote local development projects in their home country. |
| Migration and development associations | The *Association Migration Solidarité et Echanges pour le Développement (AMSED)* in France, Migration and Development and Alternative for India Development in the UK, focus on the solidarity arising from migration dynamics. |
| Umbrella organizations | *Forum des organisations de solidarité internationale issues des migrations* (FORIM),
France, a national platform created in 2002 brings together 700 networks, federations and associations dedicated to both integration issues in the home country and development activities for the host country. The National Federation of Indian American Associations (NFIA) brings together 250 organizations in the US and aims to unite different initiatives. The National Ethnic Minorities Consultative Committee, Netherlands, brings together seven ethnic minority organizations. |
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<tr>
<td>Diaspora networking</td>
<td>Information networks vary from country to country and by sector. Many lose members over time, are not regularly and consistently updated, and often fail to deliver concrete results. It is unclear whether they receive governmental support, e.g. the Ghana Abroad website which deals with all types of concerns from passports, business involvement back home and even the election of Miss Ghana in Holland.</td>
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<td>Co-development initiatives</td>
<td>In their aim to contact and collaborate with the expatriate communities abroad, many diaspora organizations offer an additional transnational bridge for both home and host countries by involving expatriate communities and members of the host country. For instance, the Dutch-African diasporas organization, AfroNeth, brings together African and Dutch members, and the German-Serbian Economic Forum German and Serbian members. The Co-operation for the Development of Emerging Countries (COSPE) is a non-profit association operating in the field of international cooperation in Italy that also involves diasporas for development.</td>
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<td>Finances</td>
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<td>Migrants can earmark a portion of the funds they send back home for a specific project. Opportunity International, for instance, channels remittances for poverty reduction through partnerships with micro-finance institutions: Metcare, Ghana, channels remittances into healthcare projects.</td>
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<td>Some informal transfer mechanisms are used where official channels are either not available, accessible or eschewed for personal reasons. The <em>Hawala</em> is a traditional money transfer mechanism mainly used in East and South-east Asia and muslim countries for anonymous, low cost, speedy and home language services. <em>Jeiqian</em> for China, <em>Padala</em> for the Philippines, <em>Phei kwan</em> for Thailand and <em>Hundi</em> for India and Bangladesh are similar informal transfer networks.</td>
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**Policy implications**

Below are some broad features and conclusions on diaspora initiatives of policy interest:

- Diaspora organizations serve as bridges between home and host countries on account of their dual membership of diasporas and nationals of the host country and are thus in a position to serve the interests of members in both the host and the home country. For instance, the Serbian-German Forum is founded on co-membership of Germans and Serbians for the promotion of trade links. The IndUS Entrepreneur network supports enterprises in India and the USA and identifies venture capital for business start-ups and growth. The Greater Sylhet Development Welfare Council, a federation of Bangladeshi community organizations in the UK, promotes the right of Bangladesh nationals to vote in home country elections and fights racial discrimination in the UK. These examples show that diaspora-led initiatives can be of equal interest to the home and the destination country.

- Many diaspora organizations are geographically concentrated in host countries and are also active in certain areas in home countries (cf., e.g. hometown associations in Mexico). Among the governments which responded to the IOM survey on policies engaging diasporas for development (IOM, 2005), 66 per cent cited hometown associations as their main interlocutors. Policies can build on this “local-to-local” dimension of diaspora initiatives.
Chambers of commerce are significant partners, in particular those with bilateral ties, such as those representing interest between, e.g. the USA and Bangladesh, Britain and Bulgaria, or the Sierra Leone Diasporas’ Council in the UK Chamber of Commerce or the Network of Colombian Chambers of Commerce. A number of studies have shown that minority populations often engage in entrepreneurship at a higher rate than national averages (OECD, 2003), which is of great interest for policymakers in both host and home countries. Pull and push factors contribute to this entrepreneurial propensity, such as discrimination in the labour market, where self-employment offers an escape from unemployment. Supportive ethnic business networks, informal family labour sources and the fact that those who migrate are often among the most entrepreneurial people can also explain this entrepreneurial motivation. There is also evidence that diaspora lobbying and advocacy have been able to favour specific trade agreements between host and home countries, such as between southern European and northern African countries. Entrepreneurship is a key area for collaboration with already existing diaspora businesses and organizations.

Scientific networks appear particularly dynamic and effective when they are related to a particular academic and entrepreneurial environment. An example is the Chinese American Association for Science and Technology (CAST) which maintains professional and regional societies in important entrepreneurial and business clusters such as Silicon Valley. Networks are more durable and affluent when related to a specific university, such as the Lebanese International Network linked to the Lebanese American University. Moreover, recent research by Béatrice Séguin in Canada (2006) showed that governments with strong diaspora policies tend to have a large number of self-identified diaspora networks focusing on the transfer of knowledge between the host and the home country.

Many initiatives depend on voluntary work and therefore reach operational limits and lack continuity (Barré, 2003). An important number of virtual networks do not have an updated website and disintegrate as soon as the founders move on to other initiatives. Divisions within diaspora associations can grow over time on account of private conflicts of interest among their members, their common ethnic background notwithstanding. The IOM report (Sidiqqui, 2005) on the Bangladeshi diasporas in the UK and USA notes how ethnic and religious communities tend to, over time, lose the common ground which originally united them.

The question concerning the autonomy of diaspora organizations relative to home and host governments is complex. Associations related to governments have their own advantages but can also lead to individuals rejecting these initiatives. Chikezi, Executive Director of AFFORD recommends that governments should rather
respect the autonomy of networks, find genuine initiatives and enable them to find their own means of securing their legitimacy.\textsuperscript{63} The nature of the link with public authorities is not always very clear; for instance, the Jamaican Diaspora Canada Foundation was founded after a two-day diaspora conference held in June 2004 in Jamaica by the government. However, this does not necessarily mean that the foundation cannot have an independent agenda. The support of international organizations (e.g. UNESCO, World Bank) ensures the viability of some networks. The UN Information and Communication Technologies Task Force, for instance, supports expatriate African IT specialists to launch high-tech businesses in sub-Saharan Africa. ALAS, the Scientific Latino-American Association, receives support from UNESCO.

There is still little systematic evidence assessing the development impact of diaspora organizations. Newland (2004) considers that policies should “build on success” and support initiatives that already exist and work well. In a number of countries, bottom-up initiatives have nevertheless been able to raise awareness, to influence and sometimes put pressure on governments to present and pursue their aims. The ADB (2004) considers that the Filipino Brain Gain Network has helped create companies in the Philippines by providing invaluable consultancy. However, the uneasiness regarding political involvement of diasporas can discredit diasporas as a whole. Consequently, in order to translate diaspora involvement into policies, it may be necessary to address each case separately in very concrete terms to avoid confusing the various individual diaspora initiatives, and to determine who the partners are, their agenda, and the best means of engaging them.
V. DEFINING HOME COUNTRY PROGRAMMES AND INCENTIVES CONDUCIVE TO DIASPORA ENGAGEMENT FOR DEVELOPMENT

Numerous home country governments have launched official programmes dedicated to mobilizing their diasporas abroad for development purposes. These governmental programmes take different forms but face a common challenge: to be recognized as legitimate by diasporas. Diaspora initiatives have usually been in place prior to these governmental programmes and diaspora groups have often acted as pressure groups, which explains the reluctance of some diaspora individuals or organizations to get involved in common activities with the government. Building real partnerships with diasporas and engaging in productive dialogue and cooperation can be a lengthy and complex process. To do so, governments create specific institutions in charge of working with diasporas, design websites to reach out to expatriates and introduce specific incentives to attract their contributions to the home country.

Programmatic responses

Examples of home country diaspora programmes include:

- **Algeria:** A government programme targeting diasporas started in 2005 is under implementation, while a Delegate Minister in charge of the National Community Abroad exists since 1996, reporting since 2002 to the head of government.\(^{64}\)
- **Benin:** The first meeting of the Beninese diaspora was organized in 1997. In 2001, a “National Policy Plan for Beninese Abroad” was launched with support at the presidential level.
- **Colombia:** The *Colombia Nos Une* programme is monitored at the presidential level and is composed of diverse political, economic and social provisions tailored to nationals abroad.
- **El Salvador:** A number of legislative decrees were adopted in order to launch the “Migrant Week”, the “Convention for Migrant Workers”, organized visits from Salvadorians living abroad and tax-free goods for visiting diaspora populations. These first executive decrees consolidated the foundations for other measures such as the nomination of a Vice-Minister for Salvadorians Abroad\(^{65}\) and the launch of the Programme *Salvadoreños en el exterior*. The programme encompasses eight strategic areas for diaspora policy making: economic integration, consular services, linkage to the civil society, human rights support, family reunification, remittances channelled to local development, communication and social and humanitarian
assistance. The main objectives are to identify the diaspora communities, build a network with this community, establish positive communication with the diasporas, establish an agenda for action with the community and change traditional policy approaches at home in order to work effectively on community affairs and perspectives.

- Estonia: The Governmental Expatriates Programme is being implemented. A Migration Foundation and a Council of Expatriates were created.
- Morocco: With the support of the Hassan II Foundation for Moroccans Living Abroad and IOM, an Observatory of the Moroccan Community Living Abroad (EOMC) was created, offering an integrated information system to strengthen the institutional capacities of the Moroccan government to address migration management issues.
- Tunisia: An annual official programme was adopted with presidential support for 2005-2009.
- Sudan: A capacity-building initiative has recently been introduced to raise both awareness and competence within the institutions in charge of populations abroad.
- Pakistan: A programme including visits of expatriate Pakistani consultants on short-term assignments for the purpose of transferring knowledge and technology was launched in 2005.
- Ukraine: The 2010 Diasporas’ Programme aims to raise awareness and improve collaboration with diasporas by 2010.
- Uruguay: A national strategic document on diasporas abroad was presented at the South American Conference in June 2003 and led to the governmental programme Programa de Vinculacion con los Uruguayos Residentes en el Exterior. The programme is run through a member-based system and calls for voluntary registration.
- Venezuela: The diaspora programme includes a census of Venezuelan residents abroad (Censo de los Venezolanos Residentes en el Exterior, 2005) and a consolidated government programme to implement the Electoral Presidential Programme 2004-2005.

In addition to the special programmes, governments increasingly reach out towards their diasporas through the Internet and by organizing special events.

Internet is the most common tool used to reach out to diasporas. An example is the governmental Armenian website offering job postings, business support and information on Armenia. The Moroccan website delivers a strong policy message reaching out to expatriates, while the governmental Syrian website offers cultural and economic information.
The number of events inviting diasporas to discuss development have increased during the last five years. Examples include:

- **Ethiopia:** the Annual Ethiopian Diaspora Day was organized in January 2005 for the third time since 2001.
- **India:** January 9 was declared in 2003 as the Celebration Day of Diasporas commemorating Gandi’s return to India from South Africa.
- **Mexico:** the Second Conference in Mexico on State-Diaspora Relations was organized in October 2005.
- **Syria:** The Syrian Expatriates Conference was organized under the patronage of President Bashar al-Assad in October 2004 and camps for young people and activities abroad such as the Cultural Week in Dresden, Germany, are regularly organized.
- **Serbia:** The event Serbian Diaspora and Homeland, Rights, Obligations and Collaboration was organized in 2002.

**Institutional arrangements**

Consulates and embassies play a key role in gathering data on diasporas, offering services to expatriates and maintaining links with the expatriate communities. An example of the key role played by consulates is the programme Mexican Communities Living Abroad where consulates facilitate the channelling of remittances from the United States towards local development projects in Mexico. Another example is Kenya, with missions and embassies mandated to be the link between the government and the diasporas and to promote a change of attitudes towards diasporas, encouraging them to gather in associations and contribute to the realization of national development goals.

The number of national ministries for their expatriates abroad has increased in the last ten years with the aim to serve expatriates, offer communication channels and respond to diaspora concerns. The recent rise in the number of instances dealing with diasporas mirrors the interest home countries have in their diasporas, such as the Presidential Office for Mexicans Abroad, the Bangladesh Ministry for Expatriate Welfare and Overseas Employment, both established in 2001; the Ministry of Expatriates of the Syrian Arab Republic formed in 2002, and the State Secretariat for Romanians Abroad, created in 2003.

Today, countries such as Armenia, Azerbaijan, Benin, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Chile, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Lithuania, Mali, Mexico, Romania, Senegal, Syria, Tunisia,
Turkey, Uruguay and Peru all have special bodies dealing with diaspora issues and the list is far from being exhaustive.

These institutions can be very diverse such as: the Vice Secretary of State for Nationals Abroad in Brazil; the Council for Turkish Citizens Abroad; the State Agency for Bulgarians Abroad; the Directorate for Chilean Communities Abroad; the Presidential Office for Mexicans Abroad; the State Secretary for Romanians Abroad; the General Directorate for Ethiopian Expatriates; the Ministry for Senegalese Abroad; and the Serbia and Montenegro Directorate for Diasporas.

Some countries multiply such instances at the national level. In Ethiopia, for instance, three different bodies deal with diasporas: the General Directorate for Ethiopian Expatriates (Ministry of Foreign Affairs); the Ethiopian Diasporas Coordinating Office (Ministry of Capacity Building,) and the Diasporas Desk in the Addis Ababa City Government Investment Authority.\(^72\) If this clearly shows policy interest, the diversification of institutions also raises issues of internal coordination.

An example of a diaspora institutional mandate is the Ministry of the Haitians Living Abroad, tasked to support with concrete initiatives the collaboration with the diaspora communities, to facilitate the services of the Haitian state to the members of the diaspora, and to advocate for the interests of the members of the diasporas.\(^73\)

The existence of institutions targeting diasporas does not necessarily guarantee that resources and capacities devoted to diaspora policies are sufficient and sustainable. Many of the least-developed countries lack financial and human resources to offer real services through their representations abroad, and non-governmental associations provide complementary services for diasporas. In addition, many programmes and institutions are relatively recent which makes it very difficult to assess their real impact on diaspora contributions.

**Incentives**

**Dual citizenship and voting rights**

The granting of dual citizenship is a significant measure adopted by home countries to formalize the belonging of their diasporas to the home country, both in a symbolic and concrete way. If the issue of dual citizenship bears many political facets and is dependent on both the regulations in the home and the host country,
home and host countries are aware of the numerous implications of this provision on diaspora contributions to development. IOM in the *International Legal Norms and Migration* Document (2004) acknowledges that dual nationality is increasingly common and that the attitude of states has changed from perceiving it as “an irritant in international relation, a status to be discouraged and prohibited in order to avoid attendant issues of loyalty and diplomatic protection”, towards recognizing that “persons can maintain links to more than one state without major interstate conflicts ensuing”. Several home countries grant dual citizenship with a view to facilitating diaspora contributions, some already a while ago, such as Egypt in 1983, targeting in particular permanent migrants or, more recently, Ghana in 2002, the Philippines in 2003 and Burundi in 2005. Ghana, for instance, considered that dual citizenship would facilitate the residence of diasporas in the home country and support investments. Armenia adopted the law on dual citizenship in 2005 in order improve the image of the country, strengthen the ties of “Armenian Diaspora” with the “historical Motherland” and facilitate investment flows. After the adoption of the law, Armenia estimated that there are 5 million Armenian citizens abroad.

In several cases, such as Australia and India, diasporas have lobbied for dual citizenship. With over 1 million Australians abroad, the Department for Immigration, Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs carried out an inquiry on the impact of the loss of Australian citizenship on acquisition of another country’s citizenship. As a consequence and due to the strong lobbying of Australian diasporas, the Australian government allowed dual citizenship in 2002. India granted dual citizenship in 2003 to Indians living in particular countries, i.e. the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, Finland, the Netherlands and Italy. In the case of Bangladesh, diasporas expressed their appreciation of the provision of dual citizenship for Bangladeshis, though a recent reform by the Election Commission stipulates that in order to vote the person has to be present in the country during the voters’ registration, making it more difficult to vote abroad.74

The right to vote abroad offers diasporas access to the home country’s political decisions and in some cases to have their specific interests represented. For example, Italians abroad have the right to elect by mail 12 representatives in the parliament and six senators to represent the interest of the Italian community abroad. Similarly, the 2 million French citizens registered abroad elect the *Assemblée des Français de l’Etranger*, which is chaired by the French Minister for Foreign Affairs.75 IOM’s experience in external voting programmes, such as for Bosnia and Herzegovina, East Timor, Kosovo (Serbia and Montenegro), Afghanistan or Iraq, shows that out-of-country voting allows people to be represented in civilian and political life at home, and that this mechanism contributes to individual empowerment, the creation of a
better socio-economic environment back home as well as creating an incentive to remain involved.

**Facilitate free movement**

Some home governments introduced special schemes, in particular to facilitate visa-free movement for people who are no longer citizens of the country of origin either because they were obliged to abandon their citizenship in order to acquire the citizenship of the host country, or because they are second-generation migrants. Foreign nationals of Ethiopian origin are issued a special ID card entitling them to move freely without visa requirements and to access national employment opportunities. The Indian PIO Card scheme is a visa-free regime for persons of Indian origin up to the fourth generation to simplify their returns and offer a range of financial and educational facilities.

**The right to buy land and property**

The right to buy land and property appears to be another powerful incentive. Portugal, for instance, eliminated sales tax on property transactions and offered subsidized interest rates for the acquisitions of properties by diaspora members. Specific provisions are guaranteed to nationals from the Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa (CPLP), i.e. Angola, Brasil, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, Portugal, Sao Tomé e Principe and Timor Leste. Finally, in the particular case of post-conflict or the post-communist countries in central and eastern Europe, the recovery of property lost upon departure during the communist times, can act as a strong incentive for investment and return. In some countries this issue remains unresolved, especially when properties were sold by the state to the new owners making restitution difficult. This issue plays negatively against diaspora returns and investments.

**Portable and transferable social rights**

The World Bank (2005) emphasizes the significance of portable social security benefits, in particular pension and health benefits. However, this portability is usually achieved through bilateral social security agreements between the sending and the receiving countries, and targets in particular temporary labour migrants. Hence, diaspora members who have been living abroad for a long time but would be interested to return to their home country are often not included in such agreements.
VI. IDENTIFYING DIASPORA RESOURCES FOR DEVELOPMENT

Human capital

Very broadly defined, the human capital available in diasporas concerns the levels of education, training, skills and knowledge that might be drawn on for home-country development initiatives. Interest in human capital should involve movements of both skilled and unskilled migrants, notwithstanding the current policy bias on highly qualified migrants, whose numbers have greatly increased and given rise to what is generally referred to as “brain-drain”.

Statistics concerning the emigration of human capital from developing countries are revealing. Thus, the UN (2004) estimates that, on average, migrants who leave from Latin America and Asia have attended school twice as long as the national average, and for Africa that proportion rises to two-thirds. Of Russian emigrants to the United States (Heleniak, 2004), 42 per cent have received higher education, compared to 13 per cent of the population as a whole. One-fifth of Chinese students study in Europe and are the second largest group of foreign students in the UK, yet only a little under one-third intend to return to China. As for the Caribbean, half of the population with tertiary education live in the US (75% for Jamaica and Haiti). Anglophone and Lusophone African countries experience the highest emigration rates of their highly skilled.

Brain drain and diasporic human capital are of concern not only in quantitative but also quantitative terms. For instance, in central and eastern Europe actual numbers might not represent a veritable exodus, but it is often the young and most dynamic who migrate abroad to work, leaving important gaps in the higher segments of the local labour market and causing shortages in sectors most important to the country’s socio-economic advancement. Lowell (2003) notes that for brain drain to occur, a country has to suffer significant losses of its highly skilled workforce and subsequent adverse economic consequences. However, few studies actually assess the consequences of brain drain or offer solutions. One example is a study by Lucas (2004) analysing the negative correlation in low-income countries between the failure of post-graduate students to return to their home country and the local wage level. The UN (2004) considers that the loss of qualified manpower causes an innovation and creativity deficit in addition to losing the investment in educating their nationals who then go to work abroad where they can earn more. The amounts at stake can only
be estimated, but they may run into several hundreds of millions of US dollars for migrants having gone to work in the US alone.

Current policy objectives are, among others, facilitating the circulation of skills able to benefit host and home countries and migrants themselves. A major policy question affecting countries of origin is whether remittances and other financial transfers can compensate for human capital loss, as this will have important implications concerning appropriate policy decisions aimed at encouraging migration or attracting diasporas to return. To determine the trade-off between permanent returns of diaspora members and the loss in terms of the financial transfers they would otherwise have potentially been able to contribute is no easy task and calls for caution and circumspection. Any simple equation where the loss in human capital can be compensated for by remittances flows may be very misleading and spell the failure of any such policy. There is no hard evidence that the highly educated expatriate workforce who are normally included in the brain drain, are also those transferring funds home. Moreover, remittances might not be directed at the areas suffering from a lack of qualified human resources, nor might they be intended to contribute to the type of sustainable growth intended by the government. Africa, for instance, receives only 1.5 per cent of the official remittance flows, nor will remittances necessarily benefit regions that are most in need of human capital.

Examples of governmental programmes targeting diaspora human capital for development purposes

Numerous programmes aim to match the needs in human capital in the home country with the supply of diaspora skills abroad, based on the assumption that without any support and incentives, the skills available in diasporas will not be transferred to the home country.

Skill-matching programmes, banks or databases are examples of this type of programme. Their numbers are increasing, in particular in African countries:

- The African Experts and Diasporas database was launched in 2002 at the Third African Development Forum in Addis Ababa in collaboration with IOM. Africa-Recruit is an initiative that facilitates the matching of professional skills available in African diasporas and job offers in African countries, supported by the Commonwealth Business Council and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD).
- Red Caldas is an institutionalized programme managed by the Colombian government agency Colciencas and aims to establish a network among Colombian researchers throughout the world and their counterparts in Colombia.
• The Philippines’ Brain Gain Network is an initiative developed in coordination with the highest government body overseeing information and technology development in the Philippines, the E-Commerce Council (ITECC). The network has a large human resources database and supports joint business projects.
• The Argentine Education Ministry set up in 2000 the RAICES programme and created a database of Argentine professionals abroad. In 2002, 1,600 professionals were registered.
• The South African Network of Skills Abroad (SANSA) was created through a governmental call, and in 2006 featured 2,200 network members worldwide.
• Other human resource banks include the following: Nigeria: the African Expert Diasporas Data Base Nigeria; Azerbaijan: Human Resources and Intellectual Pool; Benin: Competence Database; Bulgaria: the State Agency for Bulgarians Abroad; which has a database of more than 600 cultural, professional and student organizations and a Qualifications Abroad database; Kenya: Educationist and Medical Practitioners Abroad Database; Mexico: Qualifications Abroad; Pakistan: National Talent Pool, a liaison agency between Pakistani diasporas and Pakistani organizations in diverse areas of specialization; and Portugal: Professionals Abroad.

IOM’s experience in implementing migration for development (MIDA) programmes targeting temporary transfers of human capital, in particular in Africa, shows that diaspora members are highly interested in participating, provided the opportunities they are offered are credible and that cooperation mechanisms between countries of origin and of destination allow them to keep their jobs or benefits in the host country. The experience of the Transfer Of Knowledge through Expatriate Nationals (TOKTEN) programme implemented by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) shows that if for certain countries such as Mali, the results are satisfactory, identifying the right human resources within diasporas remains a key issue.

Another noticeable trend is the development of sector-based programmes that focus on specific human resource needs in the home country and target the respective professional groups within the diasporas. Khadria (in Barré, 2003) explains that countries need to identify specific sectors where there is a social return on expatriate investments that is higher and more sustainable than market returns and recommends to focus policy action on specific professional sectors, instead of pursuing many targets. The author identifies two particular sectors where the involvement of the diaspora can make a difference, i.e. education and health. Diaspora medical professional associations are indeed among the most frequent diaspora partners for governments. Examples include the Ethiopian Health Professionals in Sweden and the Zambian and Cape Verde Medical Professionals in the EU. As a consequence, governments develop specific sector-based programmes such as the Egyptian Fellowship Programme for
Egyptian doctors to work in the UK (Bach, 2003), the Philippine Sectoral Development Needs Profiling System (PHILNEED) or the Beninese Database of Health Professional Nationals Residing in France. Most advanced countries also set up such initiatives, for instance, Australia has two medical fellowship initiatives for its own expatriates abroad, funded by the National Health and Medical Research Council.

At the international level, IOM and the World Health Organisation (WHO) are in the process of developing a database by field, level of competence, country of residence and origin of health professionals. Moreover, WHO has urged its member states to adopt strategies to mitigate the adverse effects of migration on health workers.  

A key target for governmental action in the field of expatriate human capital are students. The Chinese government, in particular, changed its policies in the mid-90s to support students willing to go abroad and to provide strong incentives for their return. This strategy allowed Chinese students to join the “brain circulation”, while between 1995 and 1998 the number of returnees increased by 13 per cent annually. The return rate is expected to continue to increase by over 10 per cent annually, and more than 4000 high tech companies have already been set up by returning students (Shen Wei, 2005). Other countries, such as Mexico, encourage the return of scholarship recipients through the Repatriacion de ex becarios del CONACYT programme, while the Lithuanian government organizes scholarships for persons of Lithuanian descent and encourages researchers to return through the Return of Brains to Lithuania programme.

Within the broad range of programmes focused on human resources available in diasporas, permanent return programmes need to offer very strong incentives. Evidence from existing return programmes shows that if governmental incentives do indeed play a role in the return decision, other related political, economic and social factors also matter. A survey of more than 1500 first-generation Indian and Chinese migrants in Silicon Valley showed that 74 per cent of Indians and 53 per cent of Chinese wanted to start a business back home. Three-quarters of the Somali surveyed in the UK (Bloch, A. and G. Atfield, 2002) responded that they would like to return to the Somali region, but 43 per cent had not decided when they would want to do so. Political reasons (19%) and future uncertainty (15%) were the major obstacles to the return decision.

The evaluation undertaken by the IOM Office of the Inspector General of the Return of the Afghan Qualified Nationals programme showed that both employers and returnees confirmed the success of the programme in terms of knowledge transfer. Returnees considered their return “correct” despite major constraints in housing, schooling and salaries. IOM’s experience with return policies shows that
the employment and social perspective of the returnees back home are the key elements for success.

Diaspora individuals and groups feature diverse interests and strategies, therefore policies targeting human capital benefit from mixing short and long-term perspectives and offering temporary and permanent return incentives.

**Financial and entrepreneurial capital**

Financial transfers between the host and the home country can take many forms. These include foreign direct investments (FDI), trade, remittances, savings, start-up or business investments, purchase of real estate and humanitarian support. In addition, issues related to financial transfers attract attention to long-term development challenges, such as having an operational banking system in the home country and promoting changes in individual financial and saving behaviours in home and host countries.

There are numerous policy implications regarding the mobilization of the financial resources of diasporas. The international community is very much focused on migrant worker remittances, yet this should not ignore other forms of diaspora financial resources, and the correlations that may exist between them. At the global level, FDI increased from US$ 106 billion in 1995 to US$ 143 billion in 2002, while remittance flows almost doubled over the same period, from US$ 48 billion to US$ 80 billion (World Bank, 2003). It is difficult to establish a correlation between remittance inflows and investments. China and India, two countries that have introduced policies targeting their citizens abroad, are two important examples. Remittances sent back by the Chinese diaspora are small compared to the actual number of Chinese abroad, whereas investments in China have increased tremendously. India, in contrast, received limited foreign direct investments and major remittance transfers. Does this indicate that countries with high remittance transfers have rather limited FDI flows; and what role do incentives and macro-economic policies play?

Although information on diaspora contributions to FDI, enterprise creation and trade is still limited, there are indications that such contributions are growing in size and in importance. Thus, in 2002 about half of the US$ 48 billion FDI in China originated from the Chinese diaspora (IOM, MRS 14, 2003). In comparison, in 2002 only 10 per cent of India’s US$ 4.43 billion FDI was generated by Indian diasporas. Diaspora investments are likely to be an economic decision, generated by self-interest and driven by profit motives, even though an altruistic element and investments in social projects might also be present. Few studies investigate how migration and

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migrant networks contribute to lowering transaction costs and facilitating information exchange, thus facilitating FDI flows. One such study (Javoricik, Ozden, Spatareanu, 2004) investigates the links between migration and FDI flows, using data on migration into the US and FDI by US firms abroad and found that migrant stocks in the US influenced FDI towards the countries of origin. However, more studies to explore the correlation between the migrant stock abroad and FDI levels received from expatriate communities are needed.

Similarly, data on trade in goods and services initiated by diasporas remain limited. Lucas (2004) shows that highly skilled emigrants will have an impact on trade relations between home and host countries and that a doubling of skilled immigration to Canada from East Asia could lead to a significant increase of imports into Canada from East Asia.

The national discrepancies that can be observed in terms of diaspora investments and trade can be explained by differences in FDI policies, macro-economic conditions in home countries, different interests of diasporas (more or less entrepreneurial populations) and differences in incomes in host countries.

As far as remittances are concerned, the World Bank (Global Economic Prospects, 2006) estimated that close to 200 million people live abroad and send about US$ 225 billion in remittances, while migrant remittances to developing countries are estimated at US$ 167 billion. An estimated minimum of US$ 300 billion in unrecorded transfers should be added to that figure, while also bearing in mind that migrant workers’ remittances do not coincide with diaspora remittances, as diasporas include expatriate groups beyond migrant workers.

In 2004 Mexico (US$ 11 billion) and India (US$ 10 billion) received the highest levels of remittances, while the top sending countries are the United States (US$ 31.4 billion) followed by Saudi Arabia, Germany, Switzerland, Belgium and France. Morocco, Egypt, Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan rank among the ten most important destination countries for remittances (each receiving approximately US$ 2 to 3.3 billion annually).

Official remittances are a significant share of GDP for many low-income countries and countries with large expatriate populations abroad: Lesotho (26.5% of GDP); Haiti (17%); Nicaragua (16.5%); Yemen (16.1%); Nicaragua and El Salvador (14%); Jamaica (12%); Dominican Republic and Honduras (7%) and the Philippines (9%) (World Bank, 2005). However, only US$ 4 billion of official remittances reach sub-Saharan Africa, whereas US$ 16 billion flow into South Asia and US$ 25 billion
to Latin America and the Caribbean (World Bank, 2004). In low-income countries remittances mainly alleviate severe poverty, and households tend to use them to satisfy basic needs rather than for investment as shown in two IOM surveys, the Remittances’ Household Survey Guatemala (2004), and the Remittances’ Household Survey Colombia (2004).

Diaspora financial transfers can take several forms. Thus diaspora individuals who are able to invest in businesses can be a different group from diasporas transferring private remittances to their households back home. Investing in a productive activity calls for different incentives and guarantees than remitting financial resources back home, even though remittances can also be channelled towards productive investments. In the framework of the MIDA Italy programme, a database was created to record investment projects submitted by the African diaspora. Out of the 100 Ghanaian projects submitted, 75 were very modest in scope. These results show that some diaspora groups do not have the means to invest in their country of origin, but that they can play other significant roles, such as middle men and favour business exchanges.

Finance and business facilitation programmes

A key policy question regarding the mobilization of diaspora financial resources for development is whether to introduce special measures for diasporas, including specific guarantees and incentives. The fear of distorting the market in favour of diasporas and migrants underlies the reluctance of financial and development institutions to create such packages. Therefore, some programmes are not specifically targeting diasporas, but address general problems such as the lack of a working banking system and of a savings and investment culture. However, governments have introduced an important number of measures and programmes, some of which are schematically outlined below:

- Mexico and the US feature a successful agreement between banks and wire-transfer agencies in the US and Mexico. The agreement involves 15 financial institutions and allows Mexican migrants to open accounts in the US with an identity card delivered by consulates, while their families can withdraw money in Mexico.
- Colombia, Honduras and Chile have signed agreements between their banks and consulates.
- Zimbabwe, Sierra Leone and Peru have special agreements with Homelink, Forex and Interbank, respectively.
Some measures to favour diaspora investments:

- India and the Philippines offer tax exemptions and breaks.
- Ethiopia offers specific tax exemptions on vehicles, personal belongings and investment goods to returnees and investors.
- Bonds for expatriates: In the early 50s Israel successfully issued bonds to the American Jewish diaspora that capitalized on an emotional investment while offering very attractive features (different types of bonds, freely transferable, possibility to offer them as a gift, etc.).
- The Indian government launched in 1998 the first five-year bonds, guaranteed by the State Bank of India for non-resident Indians and renewed the initiative in 2000. However, the High-level Committee (HCL) on the Indian Diasporas noted that if Indian expatriates have not invested at high levels, this is because of a general unfavourable FDI environment and administrative burdens.
- Taxing diasporas for development is very rare. Eritrea with one-quarter of its population living outside the country, asked citizens abroad to pay a tax of 2 per cent on their revenues. Koser (2003) warns that too many governmental requests on the diasporas leads to disillusionment.
- Institutions specialized in attracting foreign direct investments are increasingly aware of diasporas as a target group. Ghana has a special agency for investments of Ghanaians abroad, and Senegal launched the diaspora entrepreneurship programme channelling diaspora investments towards some productive sectors.
- At the international level diaspora investment forums represent a new trend; the first Africa Recruit Investment Forum was organized in 2004 with the support of the Commonwealth Secretariat; the African Diaspora Investment Forum was organized in 2006 in Brussels by African Axis. These events raise awareness and provide information on various investment opportunities in Africa and are a showcase for successful stories.

A number of banks offer products and services geared to transnational populations:

- *Banco Solidario* from Equador together with counterpart Spanish banks have developed a savings account called *My family, my country, my return*, which allows migrants to fully control their finances while abroad and to put aside part of the funds to build a house or a business (USAID, 2004) at home.
- The Moroccan state-owned *Groupe Banques Populaires* (BP) offers a checking account allowing emigrants to open an account jointly with a family member back home. At least 60 per cent of Moroccan remittances transit through the BP group (USAID, 2004).
• *Banque de l’Habitat Sénégal* offers special services for migrants. *Banco do Brasil* issued special bonds to be used with remittances as collaterals. The Mexican programme Zacatecas “three plus one” matched each dollar transferred with one from the municipality, one from the state and one from the federal government.

Other initiatives aim to channel diaspora finances towards productive use:

• The Philippines launched two governmental programmes: LINKAPIL that channels diasporas’ finances towards education, health care projects and micro projects, and PHILNEED to identify projects needing financial support from Filipinos abroad. The Filipino Overseas Workers Welfare administration issues an identification card to all workers that serves as a visa card and enables remittance transfers at less than GBP 1.65 per transaction (Newland, 2004).

• In Brazil and Ecuador the Inter-American Development Bank works with *Banco Sudameris de Investimento* and *Banco Solidario* to channel remittance inflows into entrepreneurial activities.

• In Tajikistan, IOM and UNDP work with migrant households, local communities and civil society actors in rural communities to promote the investment of remittances in viable livelihoods for migrant families affected by emigration.

• In Guatemala, a pilot project is undertaken by the Government of Guatemala with Guatemalan migrants in the United States, the migrants’ families in Guatemala and IOM as the executing organization. The purpose of the project is to build homes for families affected by emigration, approximately 55 per cent of which will be financed by the government through a grant provided by the *Fondo Guatemalteco de la Vivienda* (FOGUA VI), with the remainder to be financed by Guatemalans living in the United States.

From a policy perspective, these programmes are innovative and based on partnerships among different authorities at municipal, regional and national levels. The support of international institutions and in particular international banking agencies appears to play a key role. Many questions can be raised about the sustainability of such programmes as well as the administrative burdens that they create. More evaluation exercises are needed to estimate the effectiveness in terms of costs and benefits.

**Social capital**

Social capital has acquired increasing relevance in economic, social and migration policies and refers to “networks together with shared norms, values and understanding that facilitate cooperation within and among groups” (OECD, 2001). Trust is a key aspect of the social capital notion, referring to shared confidence. The World Bank
has developed an approach relating social capital to development. There are positive connotations attached to social capital, evocative of social networks supporting exchanges, innovation, enterprise building, financial support and trust in institutions; but also negative implications that might hinder access to development, such as the perception of exclusiveness, privilege or social and political influence peddling.

Two main types of social capital influence what may be referred to as either bonding or bridging in relation to diasporas: families and friends (bonding) and communities and institutions in the host country (bridging). These may be mutually supportive or may work against each other and influence individual attitudes towards home and host communities.

The notion of social capital is relevant to diasporas’ issues and in particular to their contributions to development in their home and host countries, because it attracts attention to the specific networks and connections that diasporas share among themselves, to the special ties they keep with their home country and home communities, and to the new relations they develop with their host country and host communities. The actual impact of social capital on the engagement of diasporas for home country development is not clear and difficult to assess. However, there is evidence (OECD, 2003) that the existence of close social ties and mutual trust can facilitate trade relations and reduce transaction costs, while a lack of trust in relation to the government and its institutions, other migrants, the private sector and among diaspora members themselves hinders the development and application of policies involving diasporas for development.

Trust among migrants in host country institutions is also generally weak, especially among those whose confidence in their own institutions at home was already low. Such deep-rooted distrust will work against any policy initiatives promoted by the government. Evidence from IOM studies on Zimbabweans (Bloch, IOM, 2004) and Somalis (Hansen, IOM, 2004) show that expatriates do not want to get involved in home country development projects because of their weak confidence in institutions back home and the fear that governments do not provide sufficient guarantees for sustainable investments. In addition, the Bangladeshi case study (De Bruyn, IOM, 2005) confirms that high-income diasporas, who would have the financial means to invest back home do not invest because of lack of confidence in the government and home country investment mechanisms and banking institutions.

Building trust is a key policy objective for many home and host countries that endeavour to relate with their expatriate communities. Home countries aim to build trust through positive communication and dialogue. The Mexican President Fox ad-
dressed diasporas as “heroes”, African diasporas were identified as the “Sixth African region” at the 2004 African Summit, and the Syrian Ministry for Expatriates refers to diasporas as the “the most effective ambassadors”.

In host countries, the existence of measures targeting foreign diasporas and migrants will have a bearing on the role that social capital will play in their integration. For instance, limited public provisions can raise the importance of personal and social networks, favour geographical concentrations and encourage migrants to privilege their belonging to an ethnic or national group. At a conference convened in Canada, “Opportunity and Challenge of Diversity: A Role for Social Capital?”, the role of social networks was discussed and acknowledged as an important element in both the integration process in the host country and the maintenance of diasporas’ links with their home country. Policymakers can play a role in supporting social capital formation and nurturing trust in the host country through programmes that link immigrants and the host country, diaspora communities and the home country.

**Affective capital**

The notion of affective capital calls attention to the special commitment and goodwill that can motivate diverse types of diaspora contributions to the home country. The High-level Committee on Indian Diasporas (2001) set up to ascertain the Indian diasporas and explore how best to liaise with them, found strong evidence among the Indian diasporas of *deep and binding ties with and commitment to India’s welfare* and of *reserves of goodwill amongst the Indian diasporas deeply entrenched and waiting to be tapped*. Such commitment and goodwill reflect an interest to make a contribution to home country development and express an emotional engagement among diasporas, based on a sense of responsibility, even pangs of conscience for having left the country or a commitment to make things change, even from abroad.

Such commitments and continuing sentimental attachment has also given rise to what may be termed an ethnic and nostalgic market which caters to the tastes and habits of expatriates abroad by trading in and providing home country products to migrant communities settled abroad. A prime example are the availability of Hispanic products in the United States (Inter-American Dialogue, World Bank, 2004) and the numerous and thriving Asian outlets. Such trade relations can represent an important source of revenue and employment for home country producers and workers. The report concludes that appropriate policies must be developed to cater to the demand for nostalgic products abroad and strengthen the productive capacity and quality standards in the exporting countries. While they cater to the demand by migrant communities for products from their home countries, such policy initiatives are also in the interest
of business links that span producers and consumers in the respective home and host countries, and can encourage their expansion into other, larger market segments. An example of measures building on diaspora affective capital is the trade fair organized during the 2004 Presidential Forum for Salvadorians Abroad where nostalgic trade products attracted attention on the potential for Salvadorians exports abroad.

However, the existence of affective ties should not conceal the need for a sound investment environment in the home country, nor the profit motive that might also drive diaspora contributions. Thus, the Diasporas Knowledge Networks project launched by UNESCO in 2004 targets diasporas as network builders, but considers that on the individual level diaspora members get involved in projects for their home countries because they anticipate positive returns for their careers in the destination countries.

**Local capital**

The notion of “local capital” attracts attention to the fact that diasporas are often inclined to make investments at the local level, usually in the region or locality of origin, where they still have family ties and are familiar with the local context. The Survey of Lusophone Diaspora Networks and Associations undertaken in 2006 by IOM Lisbon showed that diaspora linkages and, in particular, transfers and investments are a local-to-local reality, with a majority of local development projects targeted to the specific areas the diasporas originate from.

Another example of the significance of the local level for diaspora contributions is the increase in community-based initiatives, such as the Mexican, Irish, Italian and Polish Hometown associations. The success of local-to-local programmes, such as Guanajato (*Adopta una Comunidad*) or Jalisco (loan support and assistance to small businesses owned by people from Jalisco living in the US) relies on the local ties that diasporas maintain with their respective regions of origin. The local dimension allows diasporas to best measure the impacts of their contributions and investments.

Governments are increasingly aware of the local dimension of diaspora involvement and develop specific programmes. In El Salvador for instance, migrant community funds are channelled through a Social Investment Fund for Development and preliminary results are encouraging in different regions such as La Unión, San Vicente, Chalatenango, La Paz, Cabañas, Cuscatlán and Usulután. The Italian government, in collaboration with the Ghanaian and Senegalese governments and with IOM’s support, launched in 2003 two migration for development (MIDA) programmes targeting African diasporas in Italy that include local development and decentralized
cooperation elements. These programmes are based on the finding that Senegalese and Ghanaian nationals in Italy are regionally concentrated in three regions, Lombardia, Veneto and Toscana and aim to link local communities in Senegal and Ghana with local communities in Italy to use local entrepreneurial knowledge to create businesses back home.

Municipalities and regions are key actors in supporting diasporas. For example, the municipality of Buenos Aires signed an agreement with the University of Buenos Aires, the Inter Regional Network of Latin Americas and the Caribbean Scientists (IRNLAC) to establish links with Argentinean professionals abroad under the name red Cre@r. The municipality of Modena also decided to work with Ghana and with Ghanaian associations because of their significant presence and to acknowledge their economic contribution to the region and their integration capacity. China has also developed regional structures targeting diasporas, for instance the Henan province, through its Chinese and Overseas Centre that actively searches for Chinese professors overseas to teach back home, the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of Guangdong Province, a regional governmental unit specifically handling the affairs of overseas Chinese. It is not a coincidence that the regions of origin of a great number of the Chinese diaspora members are also the most developed and benefit most from diaspora returns and investments (Newland, 2004).

However, this local pattern of diaspora contributions also means that diaspora support might benefit certain regions more than others and therefore a development strategy solely based on diasporas’ contributions may lead to unbalanced effects.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Governments are increasingly interested in mobilizing their diasporas abroad as illustrated by the growth in governmental institutions and programmes designed to work with diasporas. Policy interest is driven by growing awareness about the positive development impacts of diaspora contributions, as well as by active lobbying from diaspora groups. Consequently, governments multiply provisions and initiatives, targeting mainly the human and financial capital of diasporas, through diverse programmes and tools (institutional, legal, financial, etc.).

This paper touched on a number of questions that are key to the policy making process on diasporas and development: (1) How to define diasporas and gather data on diasporas?; (2) How can development strategies best incorporate diaspora contributions and maximize their effects?; (3) How to identify diasporas partners and cooperate with them?; (4) What institutional framework and incentives support diaspora contributions?; (5) What are the resources available within diasporas and how to best facilitate their transfer and maximize benefits for the diasporas and the home and host countries? The common link between these different aspects is to better understand and define policies and their role. These conclusions provide a final discussion on what this policy role is regarding diasporas and development; propose general recommendations on diaspora policy development and summarize the different key stages of diaspora policy making.

What role for policy?

To summarize, four major roles for policy emerge:

- An enabling role
  Interviews with diaspora members show that although they are interested in getting involved in development projects, major obstacles impede their engagement. Policymakers can identify and address these obstacles by, e.g. lowering transfer costs, alleviating the bureaucratic burden, simplifying procedures, allowing dual citizenship, identifying investment projects, offering security for business transactions or ensuring the portability of rights. This also implies raising public awareness on these obstacles, as well as clearly defining development priorities and strategies requiring diaspora involvement.

- An inclusionary role
  Studies on diasporas often deal with issues of image, perception, identity and trust. However, if the symbolic inclusion of diasporas does matter, real inclusion, such
as through access to rights, status and provisions is necessary. Policies can ensure the recognition of diasporas as full citizens, recognize their inputs, address major image problems, build trust, favour institutional change and build leadership. To do so, governments and local authorities need appropriate capacity to put in place policies engaging diasporas for development.

- A partnership role
  Partnership appears to be a key word referring to many types of joint actions: support and recognition of existing diasporas initiatives, collaboration between home and host countries, alliances with associations, cooperation with regions and municipalities, collaboration with private institutions, academia, public enterprises and other development stakeholders. Policy can play a key role in building such partnerships.

- A catalytic role
  Governments, regional and local authorities promote and favour a positive consideration of diasporas as development actors. Policy management is needed to avoid conflicts of interests at international level (between the host and home country) and at national level (among different stakeholders) in order to achieve policy coherence and good use of available resources.

**Recommendations**

There are very few policies on diasporas that have actually carried out evaluation exercises, and data are very scattered on how these policy measures translate in terms of returns, investments, trade exchanges and changes in social and cultural roles. Additionally, the criteria set out for success might not always fully express the results attained: return programmes might actually return very few people in terms of numbers, but set in motion real dynamics at local levels. Positive role models can play a greater role in the longer term than originally expected. Moreover, the same measure can be successful or not according to the level of analysis, i.e. individual, sectoral, collective, local, regional, national or international. It is therefore still difficult to provide a clear appraisal of programmes and measures that work, all the more as the context in the home and the host country can influence the results of policy action. Bearing in mind these limitations, policy success in engaging with diasporas, as acknowledged by governments, diasporas and experts, can be summarized along the following lines:

- Estimate the offsetting potential of macro-economic and political settings.
- Recognize the importance of trust, perceptions and images.
• Acknowledge the diversity of diaspora interests and strategies.
• Allow diasporas’ ownership of their initiatives and contributions.
• Build collaboration with diasporas based on realistic objectives, tools and time-frames.
• Relate incentives targeting diaspora contributions with diasporas’ rights.
• Provide gender-specific responses.
• Commit at high institutional level.
• Assess the potential negative effects of diasporas’ policies.
• Support internal governmental coherence.
• Establish collaboration between the home and the host country.
• Devise comprehensive diaspora policy packages.

**Estimate the offsetting potential of macro-economic and political settings**

Political stability and democratic institutions are needed to make the most of the diaspora policy option, while macro and micro socio-economic factors in the home country will influence the success of policy. The 2003 MPI study identified “poor infrastructure, underdeveloped markets, corruption, poor investment climate”, as the main reasons for policy failure. In contrast, low airfares, transportation and communication costs, as well as building effective infrastructures in home countries, offer strong incentives for diasporas to remain connected. The Dutch Presidency of the EU Council (August-December 2004) identified the lack of democracy and attractive education as the key impediment to the return of the highly skilled. Technical arrangements targeted at diasporas can be insufficient to attract diasporas if the macroeconomic and political environments are unfavourable.

Furthermore, well-designed projects can face implementation problems. Codes of conduct and protocols on recruitment are signed but are not necessarily implemented, as they are not legally enforceable. The fear of corruption and the structural economic obstacles appear to be among the main limitations to making pro-diaspora measures effective.

Portugal, South Korea and Ireland can be considered as having successfully benefited from their diasporas, as they transformed from countries of emigration into countries of immigration. All engaged in a proactive strategy towards their diasporas, yet it is difficult to aver whether diasporas were the engines for growth or if they benefited from a favourable social, economic and political development that offered the right conditions to invest, start businesses, transfer finances and finally return.
Recognize the importance of trust, perceptions and images

Negative perceptions can be real obstacles to diaspora policy development, given that bitterness, suspicion, reluctance, resentment, stigmatization or discrimination can equally arise from diasporas, populations in the home country or governments. Trust can be strengthened through positive communication and through particular measures responding to diasporas’ requests (transportation, citizenship rights, property rights, banking needs, infrastructure development, etc.). Establishing dialogue through media, virtual networks, websites, visits to diasporas and building a common agenda with diasporas through regular meetings and visits favour positive communication. However, symbolic inclusion through dialogue and communication needs to be backed up by real inclusion through rights and partnerships, while technical arrangements might not be sufficient to build trust and collaboration.

Acknowledge the diversity of diaspora interests and strategies

“Diaspora(s)” is usually understood as a collective notion, implying organized groups and collective identities. However, the collective facet of the term should not lead to considering diasporas as a homogeneous entity. The heterogeneity of the individuals forming diasporas and the diversity of goals pursued by them are one of the greatest challenges for diaspora policies. This diversity should be fully acknowledged by decisionmakers, who otherwise run the risk of estranging many individuals willing to contribute to the development of their homelands. Narrow and uniform diaspora approaches run the risk of facilitating only one type of diaspora contributions and failing to harness the full potential available in diasporas. For instance, remittance-focused policies can contribute to making the transfer of private funds safer and more efficient but will not maximize the potential of highly skilled diasporas or of second-generation expatriates eager to invest, transfer know-how to home countries or encourage transnational exchanges.

As an example, the Ethiopian government initially tried to attract and unite expatriate communities into one “diaspora”, but was then faced with a diversity of interests and expectations within the Ethiopian expatriate communities. Consequently, the government adopted a different approach, offering concrete projects for investment and identifying development priorities, allowing diasporas to chose the contributions they wished to make.

Allow diasporas to keep ownership of their initiatives and contributions

Policy can recognize diasporas’ own drive, whether driven by altruism or profit motives. IOM’s experience on institutionalizing the link between governments and
the Bangladeshi diasporas shows that governments should leave the ownership of the initiatives to diasporas themselves and give priority to diaspora concerns. In many cases, diasporas are familiar with the home country context, hence can act as first movers and start innovative programmes based on their international experience. Governmental action can support and facilitate the access of diaspora organizations that act as bridges between the home and the host country. The High-level Committee (HLC) on Indian Diasporas analysed how the governments of Lebanon, Greece, Poland, Italy, Japan and the Philippines involved their diasporas and concluded that successful governmental strategies were based on interaction with well-funded and well-staffed diaspora organizations. Chikezie, Executive Director of AFFORD considered that when collaboration with diaspora groups is difficult to establish at a high level, governments should favour grassroot strategies instead and work on the areas that are of key importance for communities and where diasporas are already active.

The example of programmes channelling remittances from consumption towards development projects, illustrates the potential risk of depriving diasporas of their decision-making mechanism. Remittances are private funds that cannot replace public investments or official development assistance, and policy can only facilitate their transfers and propose innovative programmes and tools allowing those who wish to invest in specific projects and schemes.

Build collaboration with diasporas based on realistic objectives, tools and timeframes

Governments acknowledge that they face many obstacles impeding their work with diasporas. For instance, the 2005 IOM survey on diaspora policies showed that governments encountered problems to assess the diaspora development potential, i.e. to accurately identify the resources they can offer for development purposes; to collect and especially process data on diasporas; to mobilize finances for governmental work with diasporas; to build communication among departments, community representatives and corporate actors; to build partnerships with home or host countries and to overcome competition among diaspora groups. Mobilizing finances to support governmental work with diasporas remains a major issue, in particular in developing countries. Some governments consider that financing should come from the private level, either through private partnerships or from diasporas themselves. Further evaluation of policy costs can help define the costs and benefits of programmes and measures. These obstacles and limitations need to be clearly identified and addressed to avoid unrealistic expectations from diasporas concerning government activities.

The experience of El Salvador with 2 million expatriates abroad and a local population of 6.1 million shows that genuine collaboration with diasporas cannot be
established in a short period of time. The Salvadorian programme \textit{Salvadorenos en el exterior}, for instance, is the result of 15 years of dialogue and work mobilizing diasporas and development organizations at local level.

\textbf{Relate incentives targeting diaspora contributions with diaspora rights}

Dual citizenship, voting rights, property rights, pension and social security benefit transfers, savings schemes, identification cards that also offer remittance transfer services at low rates are all examples of rights and services that can be provided to diaspora members and that formally acknowledge their transnational belonging. The granting of dual citizenship appears to be one of the most significant measures, formalizing the double belonging of diasporas. However, many countries still remain cautious on this issue. Diaspora groups have played a significant lobbying role in the granting of dual citizenship in Australia or India. Burundi, Philippines, Ghana and Armenia, among others, have granted dual citizenship in recent years with the objective of facilitating diaspora engagement.

In addition, a very strong incentive for diaspora contributions to home development is the simplification of bureaucratic procedures such as being able to register or update papers online and access to a one-stop-shop for investment or business matters. Policy should be able to define what incentives will encourage a specific diaspora group, according to their needs and expectations.

\textbf{Provide gender-specific responses}

There is insufficient awareness of how gender relations institutionalized in families and households, communities and social structures shape migration, and how they influence the potential of diasporas to contribute to development. Male and female diaspora members can face different opportunities, and often draw on different resources, networks and institutions. They can also have different expectations and some incentives will work better for one group than another. Gender is highly contextual and because it interacts with class, ethnicity, religion and other factors, it presents particular challenges for policy. Gender-blind diaspora policies can lead to inappropriate responses that do not take specific expectations into account.

\textbf{Commit at a high institutional level}

Political engagement was identified as a key reason for success, combined with political legitimacy and recognition from diasporas. Programmes supported at presidential level such as \textit{ColombiaNos Une}, achieved good results despite limited funds.
IOM’s experience of MIDA programmes also showed that institutional commitment and leadership are key to successful implementation.\textsuperscript{103}

Assess the potential negative effects of pro-diaspora policies

Research on diasporas, remittances and migration and development points out potential drawbacks and adverse effects of diaspora policies. Policymakers should be able to identify these potential negative impacts of a pro-diasporas policy in the context of their home country. Examples of such adverse results are:

- \textit{Dependency}: Remittances can represent a high injection of resources for poor countries and a source of additional income for households. However, more attention should be paid on impacts at individual, local and national levels. How sustainable is national growth based on external contributions? What are the adverse effects on employment and enterprise creation in home countries? What are the impacts on families, and in particular, children left behind?

- \textit{Inequality}: Diaspora contributions, in particular through the transfer of remittances to households can contribute to deepening the inequality between “those who have” and “those who don’t” have families abroad.

- \textit{Negative attitudes back home}: Offering specific advantages to diasporas in order to reward returning migrants or to encourage diaspora investments can provoke negative reactions in the home country and resentment against people who have not suffered like the \textit{rest of us} and who now come back with higher wages and numerous advantages.

- \textit{Limited impact on alleviating real poverty}: Studies show that remittances do not always go to the poorest, simply because they are not the ones who can migrate. These inflows of finances can also contribute to maintaining existing structures and elites and slow down necessary reforms. Diasporas-driven development policies cannot be considered as a panacea and need to be complemented by numerous other development measures and programmes.

- \textit{Growth based on exogenous factors}: This high dependency on external flows, in particular financial, coming from diasporas raises questions about endogenous development versus development led by exogenous inputs. How much do remittances contribute to innovative solutions for job creation at a local level for instance, when 90 per cent of remittances to Columbia\textsuperscript{104} go directly into consumption?
• **Making migration seem “the” solution to individual and collective development:** Positive images of expatriate role models can support diaspora engagement for development in both home and host countries. Yet, questions can be raised concerning the risks of over-representing diasporas as “winners” and “role models” and the consequences of such images on future migratory movements.

**Support internal policy coherence**

In many countries the Ministry of Interior is in charge of migration, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of diasporas and other national and local agencies are responsible for aid and development matters – hence, the challenge of achieving internal policy coherence. The lack of collaboration among different governmental bodies can often be a cause for programme delay. Therefore, the incorporation of diaspora programmes into existing development and migration strategies is a key factor for policy success. Albania, for instance, devised a National Action Plan on Migration in 2005 that is a comprehensive migration package, including a whole development strategy integrating diaspora contributions.

Awareness of the issue of internal policy coherence is growing on host countries’ side. The Netherlands outlined the articulation between their migration and development policies in a policy memorandum “Mutual interest, mutual responsibilities: Dutch development cooperation en route to 2015” (2004). In Belgium, the Senate voted recommendations to the government on the links between migration and development and a conference was devoted to the subject in March 2006. The UK House of Commons addressed the issue of internal coherence in a number of documents since 2003. Migration in general is gradually being considered in development plans, such as the European Union action plans for Afghanistan, Albania, Iraq, Morocco and Somalia.

**Establish collaboration between home and host countries**

Both integration policies in the host country and pro-diaspora policies of the home country raise issues of social inclusion and belonging. This questions diasporas’ double allegiance to the host and the home country, and potential frictions between the inclusion in the host society and the belonging to a diaspora identity. Empirical studies show that the double allegiance can work well when migrants are well integrated into the host country but still maintain links with their home country. On the contrary, migrants who live in geographically and ethnically concentrated areas and who remain exclusively loyal to their home countries have fewer resources in the host country and their contributions to host and home countries are correspondingly limited. The UK Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants (House of Commons,
2003-04) argued that the utility of migrants as development actors is linked to the improvement of their employment and social conditions in host countries: the better the conditions of migrants in the host country, the greater their impact as agents of development for both home and host countries. New Zealand, in its Settlement Strategies (Spoonley, 2004), highlights the positive outcomes for both migrants and host communities of an integration that respects cultural diversity and even favours linkages with home countries.

Better integrated migrants in education, employment, housing, social networks and communities can contribute more to their home countries than migrants with an uncertain status, who are unemployed, underestimated and isolated in their host communities. However, it is difficult to say whether in the long term the interest in the home country fades away. As Newland (MPI, 2003) sees it, the pro-diaspora policies are still too recent to judge whether people will “buy the larger notion of non-territorial membership” of their home country, or “proceed on the path of fuller integration” in their host society.

**Devise comprehensive diaspora policy packages**

There is a clear focus at national and international levels on two main aspects of the migration and development nexus: remittances and skills’ transfers. If these two elements are of major importance in the debate, they should not lead to a neglect of other related aspects, in particular other types of financial transfers such as investments, the role of diasporas as entrepreneurs or the changes in social and cultural behaviours conveyed by diaspora individuals or groups. Comprehensive diaspora packages allow diaspora members to consider positively their interaction with governments, sensing that governments are not only interested in “tapping into their money”, but are appreciative of the full range of services and skills that diasporas can offer for the benefit of the home and the host country. Diaspora policy benefits from dealing with human, social, economic and financial exchanges in a comprehensive manner, as well as from responses at different levels, i.e. international, national and local.
Diaspora policy roadmap

Define and identify diasporas

1. Gather existing data on diasporas: size, geographical distribution, gender, age, education, skills, occupational and residence status, contributions to trade, FDI and remittances flows, belonging to networks, groups, organizations and associations with a development objective.
2. Identify knowledge and data gaps as well as limitations to the registration of populations abroad. Improve quantitative and qualitative knowledge on diasporas through population census and registration abroad, questionnaires, surveys, exchange of data between host and home countries, analysis of exit and entrance flows.
3. Acknowledge the diversity of diaspora strategies, backgrounds and interests and refrain from adopting homogenizing definitions and approaches in order to be able to define a large range of areas for collaboration.

Identify key development priorities and concrete projects to build a common agenda with diasporas

4. Undertake a comprehensive assessment of development needs and priorities in the home country. The link between diasporas and development has to be well defined from the start in order to avoid unrealistic plans and unfulfilled expectations.
5. Invite diaspora representatives, associations and representatives and integrate their contributions into existing endogenous development strategies: home countries to involve representatives of diasporas in the preparation of their annual development strategies or the making of their poverty reduction schemes; host countries to work with representatives of foreign diasporas to contribute to the making of development strategies targeting the diasporas’ countries of origin.
6. Match diaspora resources with genuine development needs and facilitate cooperation between diasporas and existing development institutions (investment projects, microcredits, mutual funds) and innovative development practices (business incubators, clusters of enterprises, social enterprises, women networks, business services, activities of chambers of commerce, training, etc).
7. Support the participation of diasporas in partnerships with the private sector, academia, the public sector (hospitals, schools, etc.), international organizations, NGOs, recruitment agencies, business development services or chambers of commerce that can relate diaspora inputs to identified development needs.
8. Take existing macro and micro socio-economic factors in the home country into account during the policy design process that can offset or enhance the success of policy initiatives.

**Identify partners among diasporas and recognize their own agenda**

10. Support already formed and active diaspora networks and organizations and assist them in the realization of their own agendas.
11. Define and take into account gender specificities, interests and strategies among diaspora members as these can lead to differentiated expectations and contributions.

**Identify how and where diasporas will add value to the development agenda**

12. Profile diasporas according to professional categories, qualifications and skills; undertake an assessment of skills and qualifications obtained abroad. The focus on the highly skilled should not lead to a neglect of other aptitudes and skills vital for home and host countries.
13. Adopt a sector-based approach: provide responses according to the particular challenges of professional sectors such as information and technology, the medical professions, education, police and so on.
14. Identify what contributions are already being made by diasporas in terms of trade shares, investments and business creation in the home country.
15. Support regional, municipal and local projects that can provide specific and targeted opportunities for diasporas who are often interested in investing in their region of origin or one they know well.
16. Capitalize on existing diaspora social capital networks with a view to facilitating and lowering the cost of transfers.
17. Explore the potential negative impacts of pro-diaspora policies in the context of the home country.

**Adopt incentives that will attract diasporas to participate in development programmes**

18. Relate measures targeting diaspora contributions to the granting of rights for diasporas, such as dual citizenship, voting rights, property rights, social rights, national or special identification cards, etc.
19. Relate measures targeting diaspora contributions with the provision of services for diasporas: access to credits and microcredits, business registration services, remittance transfer services at low rates, etc.

20. Favour the transferability and portability of social rights, pensions, savings schemes, invalidity rights, etc. between the host and the home country.

21. Promote and advertise the simplification of bureaucratic procedures as an incentive to attract and channel resources from the diaspora towards development projects.

22. Define, where appropriate, special schemes for diasporas offering financial advantages, fiscal incentives and tax breaks while keeping in mind that these measures may be unpopular with the population in the home country.

Identify major obstacles to diaspora contributions

23. Explore which structural, macro and micro-economic settings, cultural, social (education, health, housing) and political contexts may hinder policy success and offset the effects of technical arrangements.

24. Identify the obstacles that diasporas perceive as barriers to their contributions: lack of an appropriate transport or banking infrastructure, bureaucratic burdens, weak partnerships, corruption, lack of support networks, unclear interlocutors at governmental level, poor consular services, etc.

Choose appropriate policy tools

25. Analyse the policy context to determine which tools will be appropriate and effective in a given environment.

26. Select from a broad range of measures: direct (tax breaks, matching funds, human capital programmes, information campaigns, homecoming events for diasporas, scholarships, etc.) and indirect (developing infrastructures, alleviating bureaucratic burden, building partnerships, developing general financial and business facilitation instruments, etc). A mixture of direct and indirect measures ensures a balanced approach.

Build governmental capacity to work with diasporas

27. Ensure that policy engagement is clear, well known and secured at senior governmental level in order to build dialogue with diasporas and the legitimacy for the policy targeting diasporas.

28. Ensure that resources devoted to diaspora policies match objectives.

29. Promote institutional change to help public servants collaborate effectively with diaspora representatives and contribute to leadership building.
30. Share knowledge with other countries working with diasporas, discuss international experiences, place the diaspora debate in a broader development and migration policy and research context.

31. Ensure that programmes feature evaluation and assessment components that can provide information on costs and benefits, the administrative burdens generated and achievements that would not have been possible without policy intervention.

**Encourage policy coherence**

32. Promote dialogue within governments and with regional and local authorities on diaspora matters in the home and host countries.

33. Establish dialogue, exchange of knowledge and partnerships between host and home countries in order to avoid that the pro-diaspora approach is in conflict with other policies, such as the integration policy in the host country.

34. Ensure coherence between pro-diaspora policies and other national policies and that they contribute to other objectives already on the economic and social agenda.

35. Ensure policy coherence between measures targeting own diasporas abroad and foreign diasporas on the territory.
## 20 Policy guiding questions

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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>How do I define diaspora(s)?</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>How do I count and register diasporas, what data do I need?</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>Who are my partners among the diasporas?</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>What are the agenda, priorities and expectations of the diasporas?</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>Who is in charge of diaspora issues in my government, how do different institutions collaborate on this matter and what are the resources devoted to these activities?</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>What are the extent and resources of my consular network and other services for nationals/citizens abroad?</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>What are the development goals, priorities and strategies I want to involve diasporas in?</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>How do they match those of the diasporas?</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>What are the main resources available within diasporas (human, social, entrepreneurial, financial, affective, local) that I want to target?</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>What know-how and qualifications are available within diasporas; what are the needs of my country in terms of human capital and how can they be matched?</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>What are the flows and trends in terms of investments and transfer of remittances from the diasporas to the home country and what mechanisms are already in place to support them?</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>What are the existing trade and business exchanges established by individuals from the diasporas with the home country?</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>What diaspora networks exist to promote exchanges between home and host countries (cultural, social, political, professional, business, academic, etc.)?</td>
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<td>14</td>
<td>What gender specificities can be identified within the diasporas: numbers of men and women, professional and educational levels, behaviour, strategies, expectations, organized networks and associations and how can my policy be tailored in response to these specificities?</td>
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<td>15</td>
<td>What is the political participation of the diasporas (citizenship, elections, eligibility, consultations, etc.) and what measures could favour diaspora participation?</td>
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<td>16</td>
<td>Are the social rights of diasporas portable or transferable (pensions, social security); if not, is it an obstacle to their involvement in activities in the home country?</td>
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<td>17</td>
<td>What is the degree of trust in the diaspora towards the government of the home country and what is the image of the home government and of the country, abroad and among diasporas?</td>
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<td>18</td>
<td>What are the main obstacles that can impede policy: tangible obstacles such as technical, financial, infrastructural, macro-economic or administrative obstacles; and intangible obstacles such as negative images and perceptions or the lack of trust?</td>
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<td>19</td>
<td>Who are my partners within the local, private, and non-governmental stakeholders that could be interested in working more closely with diasporas?</td>
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<td>20</td>
<td>Which are the main host countries where my diasporas are settled; how do I engage in a dialogue with them and what are their policies towards my diaspora groups on their own territory?</td>
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IOM activities, trends and programmes

The following IOM events, studies and programmes are quoted in this paper; the list is not exhaustive of IOM’s work on migration, diasporas and development.

**Major IOM diaspora programmatic trends**

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<th>Governance and policy dialogue</th>
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<tr>
<td>• Policy advice on migration and development</td>
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<td>• Facilitate collaboration between home and host countries on migration and development</td>
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<td>• Capacity building</td>
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<td>• Technical cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<th>Research</th>
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<tr>
<td>• Migration and development; diasporas’ surveys, diasporas’ policy survey; diaspora organizations’ survey, remittances’ surveys</td>
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<tr>
<th>Knowledge sharing</th>
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<td>• Conferences, round tables, workshops</td>
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<th>Human capital</th>
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<tr>
<td>• Skills matching</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Sector based data banks</td>
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<td>• Return and reintegration of qualified nationals (RQAN)</td>
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<td>• Mobility of health workers</td>
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<th>Financial capital</th>
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<td>• Remittances programmes</td>
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<td>• Linking remittance transfers with community development</td>
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<td>• Enhancing the impact of remittances through micro-finance</td>
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<td>• Support to social investment funds</td>
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<th>Mobilization of resources</th>
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<tr>
<td>• Reconstruction and post-conflict/post-natural disaster assistance</td>
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<td>• Migration for development programmes</td>
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Information

- Integrated information systems
- Setting up websites for diasporas
- Awareness-raising campaigns
- Diasporas for development study tour
- Diasporas and gender-specific programmes for development
- Pre-departure preparation of migrants
- Facilitation of labour migration
- Return support programmes for students and scholarship holders

Services to diasporas

- Out-of-country/external voting
- Compensation programmes

Training of decision makers on diasporas

Programme evaluation (IOM Office of the Inspector General)

Examples of events

- Workshop on Migration and Development, (February 2005) held in partnership with DFID UK and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands. The Workshop Report entitled “Mainstreaming migration into development policy agendas” was released in 2005
- Workshop on Migration and Development, (March 2006) organized by IOM Brussels in collaboration with the Belgian government, the European Commission and the World Bank
- Ministerial Conference of the Least-developed Countries on Enhancing the Development Impact of Remittances, (February 2006) held in Cotonou, Benin. The workshop report was released in 2006
- Contributions of Diasporas, (May 2006) held as part of UNITAR/UNFPA/IOM Series of Training Workshops on Key Migration Issues, launched in 2005
- Migration and Development Training Workshop organized by IOM and HEI (Institut Universitaire des Hautes Etudes Internationales), (May 2006), Geneva, Switzerland
- Workshop on Diasporas, Migration and Development for the CPLP Countries was organized by IOM Lisbon and CPLP (Portuguese Speaking Community), (June 2006)
- Dialogue with Postal Services on Remittances for Development held during the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) session in Geneva (July 2006). This Dialogue was organized by IOM in collaboration with the Forum for Postal Service Research and Development in Africa (FPRDA)
• Workshop on Migration, Development and Poverty Reduction was organized by IOM and African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF) (August 2006)

Examples of IOM programmes

Programmes directly targeting diasporas:

• Migration for Development (MIDA)
  Programme strategy for mobilizing the human and financial resources of the diasporas for development based on three major lines: (a) locate diasporas abroad and identify specific needs in Africa; (b) involve the country of residence in a joint partnership and (c) target specific countries of origin and of destination. MIDA is a capacity building programme which aims to assist African countries to strengthen their institutional capacity to support the involvement of diasporas.
• MIDA Ghana and MIDA Senegal (Phase II, 2006) Mobilization of Senegalese and Ghanaians Expatriates and of their hosting communities in Italy, (Phase I, 2004), support by Italian government
• MIDA Mobilization of African Diasporas in Belgium, Great Lakes I, II and III 2001-2004-2006, support by Belgium government; organization in 2006 of the Round Table on e-learning bringing together diasporas and academia from Burundi, Rwanda and Democratic Republic of Congo in Butare, Rwanda
• MIDA Somalia, support by USAID (2006)
• MIDA South Sudan, support by European Union
• MIDA Ethiopia, support by Swedish government (2006) and MIDA Return of Qualified Healthcare Professionals from Sweden to Ethiopia, IOM Helsinki 2004
• MIDA Micro Enterprise Development for Guinean Women through the provision of micro credits and mobilization of women from the diasporas, 2003-2004
• MIDA Options for the Ghanaian Diaspora’s Involvement from the Netherlands in MIDA mobilization of workers from the diasporas Benin, 2004, MIDA Benin
• Mitigating Brain Drain in Health Sector, IOM Ghana Netherlands, 2002
• MIDA Capacity Building for East African Governments, 2003
• MIDA Morocco (in preparation), Belgium Government

Recent “Return of Qualified Nationals” (RQN) programmes include Return of Qualified African Nationals, RQAN Phase III; Return of the Qualified Afghan Nationals, RQAN coordinated by IOM Brussels, in collaboration with the European Commission; Return of Qualified Afghan Nationals from Finland; Look and See Afghanistan, information for return; Return of Judges and Prosecutors to Minority Areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina; Reconstruction, Capacity Building and Development through the Return of Qualified Nationals to Bosnia; Return
and Reintegration of Qualified Ugandan Nationals; Return and Reintegration of Rwandan Nationals; Thai Expert Programme (THEP); Return and Reintegration of Qualified Jamaican Nationals for Development (ROT) phases I and II.

Other:

- 24-Hour Diaspora Awareness Raising Campaigns (launched in London, March 2006)
- Establishment of an Observatory of the Moroccan Community Living Abroad (EOMC), IOM and The Hassan II Foundation for the Moroccans living abroad on-going
- National Community Fund Programme for Guatemala: Joint Investment System between Local Villagers and Migrants, IOM Guatemala, 2005
- “Diasporas for Development Study Tour to the Philippines, organized with senior government officials from ten West African, North African, Middle Eastern and Asia countries, 2003
- Research and Skills Bank Development to Link Qualified Somaliland Nationals Residing in Nordic and EU Countries with Manpower Needs in Somaliland, 2005
- Technical Assistance Haitian Project (HTPA) Dialogue with the Haitian diaspora civil society, 2000
- External Voting Programmes, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, East Timor, Kosovo, Afghanistan or Iraq

Surveys

- Survey of Lusophone Diaspora Associations in Portugal, IOM Lisbon, Portugal Seminar on diasporas from the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP), to be published in 2006
- Remittances in the Great Lakes Region, IOM Brussels, English and French versions available, 2006
- Facilitation of Recruitment and Placement of Foreign Healthcare Professionals to Work in the Public Sector Health Care in South Africa: Assessment, 2006
- Research on Remittances in Serbia, IOM in collaboration with the Swiss Forum for Migration and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), supported by the Swiss government, 2006
• Enhancing the Impact of the Salvadorian Diaspora in the Development of El Salvador, pilot project 2006
• New Perspectives of Latin American Migration in Europe: Colombian Immigrants in London, IOM 1035 Fund, 2005
• Feasibility Study on Registration of Albanian Emigrants, IOM 1035 Fund, 2005
• Remittances Survey Albania, IOM Albania, 2005
• Remittances Survey in Moldova, IOM Moldova, 2005
• Remittances Research in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, 2005
• Research on Zimbabwean Nationals in the UK and South Africa, IOM London, 2004
• Remittances Survey and Research Colombian Remittances (Remesas en Colombia Desarrollo y Marco legal), 2004
• National and Household Survey on Family Remittances in Guatemala, IOM Guatemala 2004
• Enhancing the Development Impact of Migrant Remittances Tajikistan, IOM and UNDP 2004

Policy advice

• National Action Plan on Migration, February 2005, IOM Albania
• Institutionalizing Diaspora Linkage: The Emigrant Bangladeshi in the UK and USA, February 2004, Ministry of Expatriates Welfare and Overseas Employment and IOM Dhaka

Capacity building

• Integrated Migration Information System IMIS 2001. This capacity-building project, funded by the government of Italy, carried out in partnership with the Ministry of Manpower and Emigration in Egypt, offers practical solutions in some key areas of the labour migration process. Among others, the system aims to facilitate selective labour migration programmes for both sending and receiving countries, and to attract migrant remittances and migrant investments to the home country.
• Strengthening Migration Management Capacities in Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, 2001, engaging diasporas in local development.
Other

Compensation programmes – As one of the partner organizations of the German Foundation “Remembrance, Responsibility and Future”, the International Organization for Migration completed in 2005 the final payments to more than 80,000 surviving victims of slave and forced labour under the Nazi regime. The recipients of the payments reside mainly in Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovenia, but also in many other countries, including Germany, Israel and the United States.

Special IOM diaspora websites

http://www.iom.int/africandiaspora/default.htm
http://www.ethiopandiaspora.info/introduction.asp
http://www.iom-rqa.org
http://www.iraq-iri.org/
http://www.emigration.gov.eg>
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